Probabilistic logic as a unified framework for inference by Kane, Jonathan
Boston University
OpenBU http://open.bu.edu
Theses & Dissertations Boston University Theses & Dissertations
2014
Probabilistic logic as a unified
framework for inference
https://hdl.handle.net/2144/15411
Boston University
BOSTON UNIVERSITY
GRADUATE SCHOOL OF ARTS AND SCIENCES
Thesis
PROBABILISTIC LOGIC AS A UNIFIED FRAMEWORK
FOR INFERENCE
by
JONATHAN KANE
B.S., Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University, 1996
Ph.D., Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 2003
Submitted in partial fulfillment of the
requirements for the degree of
Master of Arts
2014
c© Copyright by
Jonathan Kane
2014

Acknowledgments
Prior to my enrollment in this degree program I had absolutely no previous education
in philosophy. My learning curve, therefore, was steep and I had to cover a lot of
ground in a short amount of time. It was not easy and it took away most of my
social life for three years. Still, I consider myself enriched by the experience, and do
not regret it. Therefore I want to thank all those who made this accomplishment
possible for me. First, my advisor, Professor Judson Webb, who is a walking store-
house of philosophical information. I was always impressed by his knowledge of the
foundations of mathematics and logic, two of my favorite subjects. Next, Professor
Alisa Bokulich, who seemed to be able to refute any supposedly novel idea I thought
I had by recalling a real historical counter-example. Finally I thank Bill Rodi, who
has been on my committee for a graduate degree twice. His breadth of knowledge,
both theoretical and applied, has been an inspiration. I can’t thank him enough for
the many illuminating conversations we’ve had over the years.
I must also thank those who have no idea what I’ve been studying or why, but
have supported me nonetheless. Most important among them are my father, William,
my mother, Loana (watching over me from somewhere else...), my brother, David and
his family, and all my close friends in Boston and elsewhere.
My greatest thanks, however, go to God, whom I don’t fully understand, but do
fully love. I thank Him for this opportunity to return to school and ponder the deeper
foundations of issues I find interesting. I pray that all the effort I put into writing
this thesis, however flawed and imperfect it might be, will serve to glorify Him in
some way.
Blessed is the man who meditates on wisdom
and who reasons intelligently.
Sirach 14:20
iv
PROBABILISTIC LOGIC AS A UNIFIED FRAMEWORK
FOR INFERENCE
JONATHAN KANE
ABSTRACT
I argue that a probabilistic logical language incorporates all the features of deductive,
inductive, and abductive inference with the exception of how to generate hypotheses
ex nihilo. In the context of abduction, it leads to the Bayes theorem for confirming
hypotheses, and naturally captures the theoretical virtue of quantitative parsimony.
I address common criticisms against this approach, including how to assign probabili-
ties to sentences, the problem of the catch-all hypothesis, and the problem of auxiliary
hypotheses. Finally, I make a tentative argument that mathematical deduction fits
in the same probabilistic framework as a deterministic limiting case.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
Inference is how we obtain knowledge of the world around us; we do it almost con-
stantly, sometimes without being consciously aware of it. The term can refer to de-
riving conclusions from premises we assume are true, such as when given that x = 5
and y = 2, we can infer that x+y = 7. It can also refer to the process of constructing
a hypothesis that explains current observations and predicts new ones, such as when
upon observing thousands of white swans, we infer that all swans are white. Inference
can also be the process of choosing between several competing hypotheses that all
explain observations, e.g., when we find the lawn wet in the morning, we can infer
that it rained during the night. Although each of these examples is a case of inference
in a general sense, there seem to be marked differences between them, and, in fact,
philosophy has traditionally understood each as representing a different concept.
The first example is a mathematical deduction, which is a special case of deductive
inference. Deduction is transformative; it does not create information, but rather
brings out the (not necessarily apparent) implications of a set of premises through
accepted rules of logic.
Our second example above is a case of inductive inference, and, unlike deductive
inference, it is understood to be ampliative with respect to information; it seeks to
take a finite number of observations and infer a general rule from them which can then
be used to make an unlimited number of future predictions. The observation that all
swans are white allows one to predict the color of the next swan to be encountered,
1
2and the one after that, etc. Inductive inference essentially seeks to create a deductive
system that logically implies the observations.
The third example above represents abductive inference, also known as inference-
to-best-explanation. It seeks to find the single hypothesis from among many that is
the most likely cause of observations. In the case of the wet lawn in the morning
there are other possible explanations for the situation: a sprinkler system, morning
dew, etc. The study of abductive inference seeks to understand how one chooses one
of these over the others.
The relationship between these three categories, all of which legitimately can be
called “inference”, has not been well understood. Historically, philosophers have
tried to formulate inductive inference based on deductive principles, but this has
been fraught with difficulties and may not be possible1. Abductive inference seems to
be very similar to inductive inference, since both attempt to find a hypothesis from
which one can deduce observations; the difference being that abduction chooses from
among several existing options, while induction generates hypotheses ex nihilo. That
said, abduction also resembles deduction in the sense that it is possible to deduce a
best hypothesis given existing observations by using the methods presented below in
Chapter 4.
My first goal in this work is therefore to clarify these issues by constructing a uni-
fied framework for inference from which deductive, inductive, and abductive varieties
can be seen as merely different aspects. I begin by presenting deductive inference,
which requires a language (syntax), rule(s) of symbolic manipulation, and premises
from which all theorems in the language can be deduced. Due to its well-understood
structure, scope, and it’s use as the basis for mathematics, I limit myself to the lan-
guage of First Order Logic (FOL) in this work. I next present inductive inference and,
1Gillies (1996) gives an thorough account of attempts at representing inductive inference through
a deductive framework in the context of artificial intelligence.
3along with it, the concept of probability. Probability is required because sentences
that refer to real world examples of inference often have varying levels of uncertainty
associated with them, and probability has historically been the most common way
to quantify it. By assigning probabilities to premises, and conditional probabilities
to theorems given that the premises are true, we are able to construct a probabilistic
logic. Non-probabilistic deductive systems (e.g., mathematics) are then special cases
of this general structure where probabilities of sentences are either 1 (certain) or 0
(impossible). For induction I also need to present the concept of observation — a the-
orem known to be completely true in the deductive system. Observations can “prune
the deductive tree” of all implications and premises that are inconsistent with them.
The theoretical virtue of simplicity also arises naturally in a probabilistic framework,
and is directly related to setting prior probabilities on premises and likelihood values
on implications. I finally present abduction, which in a probabilistic logic is equiv-
alent to either calculating the Bayesian posterior probability, or else searching for a
hypothesis that maximizes the likelihood.
My second goal in this work is to argue that the Bayesian viewpoint captures all
the relevant aspects of abductive inference. Chapters 2 and 3 can then be seen as
background material necessary for the discussion of abduction in Chapter 4. I examine
several problems traditionally associated with Bayesian confirmation theory: First,
I look at the question of which approach should be used to assign probabilities to
sentences. In Section 3.2.6 I make a case for a Modified Propensity theory by drawing
upon the work philosopher Donald Gillies. Second is the problem of the catch-all
hypothesis, where we cannot assign a probability to the negation of a sentence when
it amounts to an infinite number of other sentences. This prevents us from calculating
probabilities of theorems, and as a consequence, calculating posterior probabilities. I
do not offer a definitive solution to this problem, but I paint an approach that may
4lead in the right direction, and point out an inconsistency in the previous work of
other philosophers. Following this I look at the problem of auxiliary hypotheses, where
extra hypotheses are inserted into an inference problem in order to avoid rejection of
an irrationally preferred choice; I argue for a couple of criteria that can be used to
solve this problem.
Four examples are used throughout this work to show the connections between
deduction, induction, and abduction, as well as the scope of applicability of the
Bayesian method. They are drawn from the philosophy of science, medicine, law,
and statistics. For each of these examples I assign probabilities to hypotheses and
implications, and from them I calculate probabilities of theorems in Chapter 3, and
then posterior probabilities of hypotheses in Chapter 4. An important point to make is
that I am not suggesting that all inference problems can be practically solved through
formal symbolic manipulation in Bayesian inference; this has never been done in the
philosophy of science and is probably not possible. Rather, I pose my framework
as a way of viewing all inference problems in principle, which sometimes leads to
practical quantitative algorithms, but otherwise only us gives a structure in which to
discuss differing viewpoints. The numbers I assign to probabilities and likelihoods in
Section 3.4 are therefore not intended to portray their true values; rather, they just
illustrate that to the extent such probabilities can be assigned, posterior probabilities
of hypotheses can be calculated in all the examples.
In stating what this work is about, it is also important to clarify what it is not
about. In Figure 1·1 I try to capture what I consider to be the “big picture” of
how we infer knowledge about reality. The figure pertains to two different scientific
theories that explain observations. The bottom box represents all true sentences
that could possibly be uttered about the nature of planetary motion. These truths
are then manifested in every astronomical observation that humans make. These
5Figure 1·1: Reality presents itself to us through observation. From
these we construct mental models of some of its features. Two witnesses
of the same observations may construct different models. I focus on the
middle-top box, where we represent semantic concepts in a formal lan-
guage, and then either deduce theorems or abduce a best hypothesis.
Without the common language there can be no comparison of the mod-
els.
6observations are represented by the images in the middle box which show data being
collected. At the upper left and right we have two boxes representing the minds of two
different people who have witnessed similar observations — in this case Ptolemy and
Copernicus. Although both theories incorporate mathematical laws that accurately
predict the observations, they are obviously different in the ontological reality they
postulate. We thus have two scientific systems, one approximately true (Copernicus),
the other completely false (Ptolemy), that can both make accurate predictions. The
box separating the two minds represents language, which is used to symbolically
represent their mental models, formally check for internal consistency, and compare
with each other.
There are many deep philosophical problems represented in the simple diagram in
Figure 1·1. For instance, how can we be sure that the mental model of any observer
will ever approach the truth? Or even more skeptically, perhaps there is no bottom
box, and no deep laws of nature to strive towards – how can we be sure? Another
question involves whether there is any logical reason to believe that the mental ob-
jects in one mind can accurately reference the ontological reality, or be successfully
translated to the other mind via language. Will “gravity” in one mind ever mean
exactly the same thing in the other mind? These issues are interesting, but out of
the scope of this work. I will take it as a given that there is indeed a reality that
we are trying to approach with our mental models (hence I am a realist). I will also
take it as a given that through communication humans are able to at least approxi-
mately transfer the mental objects from their minds to the minds of others — after
all, these have been the assumptions of most of humanity throughout history and
seem to work. I will instead focus solely on the top level of the diagram where formal
symbolic manipulation can be used to compare different possible structures of reality
to the observations in order to choose the most rational one.
Chapter 2
Deduction
In this chapter I will discuss the first of the three categories of inference, deduction.
My discussion will be centered around formal logic. I will focus on its basic structure
and limits, and show that both mathematics and science are represented in the same
language, and from this viewpoint they can be seen as not being very different from
each other.
I will conclude with examples of formal deductive systems taken from the philos-
ophy of science, medicine, law, and statistics, all of which will be expounded upon in
later chapters.
2.1 Deductive Inference and Logic
Deductive inference is translational; it begins with a list of premises in a language,
and attempts to find useful conclusions that are consistent with, and derivable from
them. If the premises are taken as self-evident and not reducible to other statements,
they are called axioms. It is the method of mathematicians, who seek to tease out
interesting theorems from the basic axioms of set theory.
Two essential properties of a correct deductive argument are
1. The premises must be true.
2. The conclusion must be an inescapable implication of the premises.
The second of these properties is known as validity. Deductions that obey these two
7
8properties are called sound arguments. The accepted rule of deduction1, known as
Modus Ponens, allows us to infer that a conclusion is true given that the argument
is sound. In symbolic form it is
{H,H → T} |= T (2.1)
where H represents a premise or hypothesis2, T represents an implied sentence (a
theorem), → is the usual symbol for if/then conditional3, and |= denotes that the
consequent is a valid conclusion of the sentences in the antecedent. Based on such an
argument, T can now be used as an additional premise that can be combined with
other sentences to make further deductions.
A famous example of a sound argument has H being “Socrates is a man.” and
H −→ T being “If Socrates is a man, then he is mortal.”. The conclusion of this
argument, via Modus Ponens, is therefore “Socrates is mortal.”. Arguments can be
valid without being sound; substituting the words “Mickey Mouse is a man” for H
in the deduction would be such an example. Arguments can also be invalid, yet with
true premises, such as when we substitute the words “If Socrates is a man, then he
can fly.” for H −→ T .
Representing sentences by symbols that may have a truth or falsity value, and
combining them with logical connectors produces sentential logic, the simplest artifi-
cial logical language. It would seem that nothing more is needed to study deductive
inference; one must only make sure that the premises are true and that the deduc-
tions follow logically. Experience has shown us, however, that this is not enough,
1According to Enderton (2001), there are different ways one can develop a deductive calculus:
one can either have a single rule of inference, Modus Ponens, and assume many logical axioms, or
else assume many rules of inference and no logical axioms. Either approach amounts to the same
thing.
2I will use premise and hypothesis interchangeably. I will also use the terms prediction and
theorem as synonyms.
3I will assume the reader is familiar with sentential logic and its usual symbols: → “if/then”, ↔
“if and only if”, ∧ “and”, ∨ “or”, and ¬ “not”.
9and that a finer granularity is sometimes needed to examine our arguments. Beyond
sentential logic, other formal languages build upon its basic vocabulary by including
operators, variables, functions, predicates, and constants. Most, but not all, sys-
tems hold to the law of excluded middle (H ∨ ¬H) and the law of double negation
elimination (¬¬H −→ H). The most notable exception to this is intuitionistic logic
(Moschovakis, 2014) formulated by Dutch mathematician L.E.G. Brouwer (van Atten,
2011), which was used the create the non-classical, constructionist axiomatic system
of mathematics. Among all classical formal systems of logic, the one that has received
the most attention in the last century is First Order Logic (FOL). It underlies the
Zermelo-Fraenkel axioms of set theory with Axiom of Choice (ZFC), and thus is the
basis of practically all modern mathematics (and therefore necessary for all physics
and most other sciences and engineering disciplines).
Formal logical systems remove much of the redundancy of ad hoc languages4 and
boil arguments down to their essential components, which we represent as symbols.
These symbols help us keep track of all the premises and implications at the same
time and organize our thoughts. Additionally, by connecting syntactic symbols to
semantic concepts, and then applying Modus Ponens to the symbols, we may arrive
at true statements that would never have been clear to us if we kept and manipulated
all the information in our minds. A case in point for this would be ZFC. From its ten
axioms5 almost all of modern mathematics can be derived as theorems. Although we
can hold the meaning of each of its axioms in our minds with perfect clarity, there is
no way to internally arrive at the truths of calculus, topology, or algebra; these theo-
4It should be noted, however, that the artificial languages used in logic, like our ad-hoc languages,
are also redundant. In sentential logic, for example, multiple basic connective symbols are used, when
it can be shown that only one is necessary to allow a complete characterization of truth, e.g., either
the ↑ (“nand”) or the ↓ (“nor”) symbol. This seems to show that the most concise language is not
necessary the most useful. At the cost of a larger vocabulary and redundancy we can shorten the
length of the sentences we write.
5The usual formulation of ZFC uses ten axioms. It can be shown, however, that only eight of
them are independent.
10
ries have required symbolic manipulation done on paper by countless mathematicians
over many generations to deduce. Another good example of a useful deduction we
could never perform in our minds is the computer simulation of a complex physical
system. We can understand in our minds the premises (the laws of physics with
boundary/initial conditions), but we cannot work out in our minds what the simu-
lation will be. The computer essentially works out the deductive implications of the
premises and gives us the simulation as a theorem of the deductive system. This ca-
pability of fast and error-free symbolic manipulation is why computers were created
in the first place.
A final benefit of formal logical systems is that they can ascertain truth of theorems
based solely on the syntactical form of the argument. Whereas some statements in a
language are true only relative to the semantic structure being referred to (such as the
axioms of ZFC are true relative to sets), there are also certain sentences that hold true
regardless of what the symbols refer to; i.e., certain sentences are universally valid
regardless of the semantic content. In sentential logic these are known as tautologies.
In FOL they are called logical axioms, and include the tautologies (see Enderton
(2001, page 112) for a list of all the logical axioms).
The question might be asked “Which formal logical language is correct?”. Some
are incompatible with one another (e.g., intuitionistic versus classical logic), and we
must choose one or the other in representing a certain universe of discourse. Among
the classical formal languages, the domain of applicability may be different, in which
case the answer may depend on which semantic concepts are being discussed. For
example, discussing the necessity, possibility, or provability of objects may require
the operators used in modal logic (Garson, 2014), rather than those of FOL. Just as
certain concepts are easier to state in one informal language rather than another, per-
haps it is the same in formal languages. In his book discussing recent computational
11
efforts towards artificial intelligence Donald Gillies (Gillies, 1996, pp. 95-97) gives
examples where certain deductive languages have been more or less fruitful, depend-
ing on the problem at hand. The logical languages examined by Gillies are attempts
at automating inductive inference; they have a logical structure, but also include a
“control” that allows a computer program to find law-like behavior in empirical data.
Gillies finds that certain languages are better at expressing certain semantic concepts
than others, and therefore better at performing inductive inference:
... it is ... appropriate to use a logic which draws reasonable conclusions
...
What emerges is the idea that there is not a single universal logic, but
that different logics may be appropriate in different contexts or problem-
situations.
Clearly then classical logic is of very great importance, but it is not
universal, because there are application areas for which standard mathe-
matics is not the appropriate tool.
Thus logic is indeed empirical rather than a priori.
Examining whether Gillies is correct in this claim is beyond the scope of this work,
and I refer the reader to Gillies’ book for further investigation. I will only say that
I am currently uncertain as to whether logic is indeed a priori. Given the success of
FOL at many different applications, and the dearth of applications for other formal
logical languages, I still entertain the idea that it may indeed be the language of logic
for expressing any and all deductive concepts. Due to this scope of applicability and
its centrality in mathematics I will only use FOL for the remainder of this work and
assume it is appropriate for expressing our examples.
Since FOL subsumes sentential logic, it keeps the sentence symbols of sentential
logic as 0th-order predicates. I maintain that the following substitutions into 2.1 using
12
higher order predicates are needed to represent the hypotheses and implications used
in science, mathematics, and statistics that I will discuss below:
H ←→ (∃c(c = c′))︸ ︷︷ ︸
#1
∧ (∃c ∀x ∃y Lcxy)︸ ︷︷ ︸
#2
(2.2)
and
T ←→ (∃x1∃y1(x1 = x′1 ∧ y1 = y′1) ∧ · · · ∧ ∃xN∃yN(xN = x′N ∧ yN = y′N))︸ ︷︷ ︸
#3
(2.3)
This requires some explaining. Symbols in boldface signify an array of objects, e.g.,
c is the collection of parameters {c1, c2, . . . , cM}. Symbols with a ′ after them are
constants, i.e., fixed objects in our universe of discourse. The equality predicate
c = c′ in #1 says that there exists an array of parameters (the c) in our universe
that equals an array of constant values (the c′). The three-place predicate Lcxy
in #2 is a law6 that describes a functional input/output relationship between x (the
independent variables) and y (the dependent variables). It has adjustable parameters
c, which might be initial conditions, boundary conditions, coefficients of a differential
equation, coefficients of a polynomial, etc. The existential quantifier over c says that
there exists a particular choice of c such that the law holds. The for-all quantifier over
x says that this relationship holds for all the objects in the universe that x can refer
to. The final existential quantifier then says that for each x there is a corresponding
output y. #3 then lists the input/output combinations that constitute our set of
observations.
The relationship described here may arise in a number of settings, e.g., when fitting
a polynomial curve through data, or perhaps when modeling planetary motion. In
6The “law” may be a fundamental physical relationship, or just an empirical model that fits data.
I am not addressing the problem of explanation versus modeling in this work, and therefore do not
distinguishing between the two.
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the former, c would be the coefficients of a polynomial of some order (higher degree
polynomials would have more coefficients), x would be the independent axes on a
graph, Lcxy would be the form of the polynomial, and y would be the value on the
dependent axis. In the latter example, c would be the masses of bodies, x would be
spatial coordinates, and Lcxy would be Newton’s laws relating masses at different
locations to the forces y on other bodies. I will examine these particular sentences
again in Section 3.2 in the context of probability in inductive inference.
Returning to the concept of soundness, it can be restated as follows7:
If H ` T then H |= T . (2.4)
` represents a sequence of steps using H along with the logical axioms and Modus
Ponens to establish theorems in the formal language. This statement essentially says
that if you can start with correct premises and prove something, then it is a true
implication.
There is a converse statement to 2.4 known as completeness, and it occupies an
equally important place in the study of logic:
If H |= T then H ` T . (2.5)
Completeness says that if something is true, then you can prove it in your formal
language. Whereas soundness can be proved quite simply with a few lines of written
argument, a proof of completeness is not so simple, and first appeared for the lan-
guage of FOL in Kurt Go¨del’s doctoral dissertation in 1930.8 Later, in his famous
incompleteness theorem, Go¨del went on to show that when expressing certain seman-
tic structures with their associated axioms in FOL we no longer have completeness.
7Note that this is a statement in English, not in the formal language. ` and |= are symbols in
English used to express concepts of provability and validity, respectively, in the formal language.
8For proofs of both 2.4 and 2.5 see Enderton (2001, pp.131-141).
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This means that there will be sentences that are true in a formal system, but are
unprovable from the premises, thus pointing out a fundamental limit of reasoning
deductively about the structures. In can be shown, for example, that ZFC and all the
theory of mathematics that it produces, is incomplete. This result shook the founda-
tions of the mathematical community — putting an end to efforts by mathematical
giants such as David Hilbert to prove that all theorems in a formal mathematical
system (like ZFC) could eventually be proved, given the correct axioms.
Another desirable property of a deductive system is that it should be consistent,
i.e., it should not be possible to prove both T and its opposite ¬T from the premises.
Such an inconsistency implies any statement whatsoever in the system9. Simpler
logical systems can sometimes prove whether or not their premises are consistent.
ZFC and most others systems of interest, on the other hand, cannot. For these
formal languages the question of consistency is semi-decidable: one can never be
100% sure that the deductive system is consistent, but one can be 100% sure that it is
inconsistent upon encountering a contradiction. Although consistency is an absolute
requirement in a formal language like mathematics, where we can only ascribe truth
or falsity to statements, we can relax this constraint by assigning varying degrees of
truth to statements with probability theory, which we will do below in Section 3.2.
2.2 Mathematics=Science?
In both mathematics and science, the premises are open to revision, and this is usually
done when a internal contradiction is encountered. In mathematics it is all-or-nothing
— a contradiction is absolute and implies that the premises must be changed. A
historical example was the revision of Frege’s Axiom of Comprehension in light of
Russell’s paradox (Irvine and Deutsch, 2014). The inconsistent result was that a set
9This is because the law of contradiction implies any statement: (T ∧ ¬T ) −→ Z, for any Z.
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both could, and couldn’t be a member of itself (T ∧¬T ). In science, the contradiction
is relative — if it is strong enough, the premises should be changed. An example from
physics is the failure of general relativity at small scales and the failure of quantum
field theory at large scales. The theorems implied by each are contradictory, which
has led the physics community to try to revise its axioms and create a unified theory.
It may also be the case that there is no contradiction, yet an observation cannot be
deduced from any of the premises. If it can be proved that the sentence is independent
of the current premises, it can be included as a new premise10. This was done in
mathematics when the Axiom of Choice was incorporated with the original Zermelo-
Fraenkel axioms.11
If a theorem can’t be derived from the premises, it’s independence can’t be proved,
and there is no obvious contradiction with the current system, then the sentence
remains as a “conjecture” until one of those conditions is met. In mathematics this
is the status of various mathematical sentences such as “Goldbach’s conjecture” and
the “Riemann Hypothesis”, for example. In physics, Dark Energy has this status; it
is not certain whether it will eventually encompass another law, or if it will ultimately
be a consequence of existing principles. It should be noted, though, that sometimes
the derivation of a theorem from accepted premises is only found after centuries of
work — as in the case of Fermat’s Last Theorem. We therefore see that there is an
empirical aspect to deductive systems. Whether dealing with mathematics or science,
there seems to be a progress over time; as the number of observations increases, the
chance increases of either finding a proof from the premises, or showing a contradiction
(and thus revising the premises), or else proving independence (and thus including it
10Go¨del, and later Chaitin (2003) advocate this quasi-empirical approach for mathematics and
view it as a way for mathematics to grow and increase its scope of applicability.
11The negation of Axiom of Choice could have been added to the Zermelo-Fraenkel axioms, instead.
It would have generated a different theory of mathematics, but one without many of the theorems
that most mathematicians take for granted.
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or it’s negation as a new premise).
These comparisons raise the question of whether science and mathematics are
truly different, and if so, what are the differences. Differences related to consistency
and contradictions mentioned above are only in a relative sense, where sentences in
mathematics lie at the absolute ends of the spectrum of truth and falsity. A more
plausible difference comes in the meaning of “observation” in each language. In
the sciences this term refers to a sensory measurement of some phenomenon, either
directly, or indirectly with other instruments. In FOL this concept was represented
by (∃x∃y(x = x′ ∧ y = y′)), which said that in nature we see a relationship holding
between certain x’s and y’s that are measured. I will argue that the above-mentioned
conjecture/hypothesis (i.e., a mathematical relationship that always seems to hold
whenever tested mentally) is equivalent to a theorem being observed to be true. In
the case of mathematics, however, these theorems along with input/output values are
thought up and analyzed in our heads in order to observe whether the relationship
holds. Thus it seems that the same logical structure holds for both mathematics
and science. The only difference is the semantic structure being modeled and the
interpretation of what it means to be an “observation”.
Assigning probabilities to sentences (Chapter 3, below) can hypothetically be
done in mathematics as it is in science; just as our senses can be fooled when observ-
ing scientific phenomena, our mathematical intuition can be fooled when observing
mathematical phenomena. Or, put another way, just as we can assign uncertainty to
scientific premises and observations, so can we assign it to mathematical axioms and
conjectures. I therefore argue that perhaps the only difference between the deductive
systems of science and mathematics are the objects being discussed and the values of
probabilities assigned the sentences. This, however, may lead to a paradox, which I
discuss briefly in section 3.2.8, below.
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2.3 Examples
Figure 2·1 gives a graphical representation of the structure of ZFC mathematics.
There are ten hypotheses, which in this case are assumed to be irreducible axioms,
from which all mathematics can be derived. The dashed arrows show theorems being
derived from the axioms. Exactly which axioms and theorems are being used here is
irrelevant; the point is to show what the deductive tree would look like in the case
of set theoretic mathematics. The mutually exclusive choices for hypotheses in each
closed curve are the axioms and their negations. If we assume each axiom (and not
it’s negation) is true, then the implied theorems are also true. If we were to assume
the negation of an axiom (e.g., the Axiom of Choice) we would have a different system
of mathematics. The negation of an axiom would then not necessary imply either the
previously implied theorem or it’s negation.
Figure 2·2 shows another deductive tree that illustrates a couple of differences.
In this case each hypothesis is not constrained to have two possible choices (the
hypothesis and its negation). Instead it may have multiple sub-hypotheses12. What
is important to note here is that within a closed curve, the choices of sub-hypotheses
are mutually exclusive. H3,1 or H3,2 may be true, but not both; however, H3,1 may
be true simultaneous to H1 being true (because they are independent of each other).
For examples where there is only one hypothesis containing multiple sub-hypotheses,
I will refer to the sub-hypotheses as ‘hypotheses’ for convenience and simplicity.
In Figure 2·3 through 2·6 we show a few specific examples of deductive systems.
These examples will be revisited in both Chapters 3 and 4 where we will inductively
assign probabilities to sentences and abduce best hypotheses, respectively. The col-
lections of sub-hypotheses in these cases are exhaustive due to the inclusion of the
12I will refer to mutually exclusive sentences within a closed curve as sub-hypotheses or sub-
theorems when needed to differentiate it from the idea of a hypothesis being the entire set of sentences
within a closed curve.
18
Figure 2·1: Deductive system related to the ZFC system of mathe-
matics. There are ten axioms from which theorems are deduced, and
from these theorems other theorems are deduced. The theorems (and
not their negations) are deduced with absolute certainty given that the
axioms (and not their negations) are known to be true with absolute
certainty.
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Figure 2·2: An arbitrary deductive system. Within a closed curve the
possible sub-hypotheses or sub-theorems are mutually exclusive.
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the “other” hypothesis (this is known as the catch-all hypothesis, which will be ex-
amined in detail in Section 3.3, below). Again, if a theorem is a clear implication of a
hypothesis, a dashed arrow is drawn from the latter to the former. Arrows are lacking
from the catch-all hypothesis to any of the theorems, since without defining what the
catch-all actually means, it makes no sense for it to imply anything in particular.
The first example in Figure 2·3 comes from the history of astronomy, where we
compare Ptolemaic versus Copernican theories. The Ptolemaic theory postulates that
the Earth is the center of the universe with other planetary bodies revolving around it.
Thus it implies no parallax in astronomical observations of stars or varying brightness
of planets, but it does accurately predict planetary motion. Copernican theory, on
the other hand, puts the Sun at the center of the universe; while it also accurately
predicts planetary motion, it additionally implies parallax and varying brightness of
planets throughout the year.
Figure 2·4 shows an example of a hypothetical deductive system drawn from neu-
roscience where a doctor is trying to diagnose the cause of Parkinson-like symptoms
based on a couple of observed attributes of the patient. The possible hypotheses here
are that the symptoms are either caused by a so-called Parkinson gene (the usual
cause in young patients), a slow build-up of Lewy bodies in the Substantia Nigra area
of the brain (the usual cause in elderly patients), or else the side effect of chemicals
found in hard drugs used by addicts. In contrast to the last example, arrows do not
go from all hypotheses to all theorems; e.g., an arrow is missing from the hypothesis
“chemicals in hard drugs” to theorem T1, because it does not imply onset of symptoms
in either old or young patients. In a probabilistic setting we can assign probabilities
and thus allow implication arrows, but in this purely deductive setting we cannot.
The third example in Figure 2·5 pertains to the guilt/innocence of someone ac-
cused of wrong-doing. Although the canonical example for such a situation is a legal
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trial of an accused defendant, I have chosen a more informal example for illustration
here. In my example a man named Bob is suspected on cheating on his wife and
three observations, if observed to be true, would seem to give damning evidence for
this conclusion13. These observations are that someone observed him with another
woman at a bar, that his wife found a receipt from a local jeweler that she knows
nothing about, and that Bob came home from work with lipstick on his collar. These
can each be thought of as a theorem implied by a hypothesis in the deductive sys-
tem. Although one hypothesis is that Bob is guilty of cheating, in his defense he
has offered up a complex counter-explanation for these observations in which there
was some other guy at the bar who looked like him, that his mother visited him at
work and got lipstick on his collar by kissing him, and that his watch broke, thus
resulting the bill with the jeweler. In this situation either hypothesis can imply either
a theorem or its negation; in fact, considering that it is unlikely Bob will be caught
in this situation regardless of whether he is cheating or not, it is more likely that
the negations would be observed. Thus in this example no arrows are drawn from
hypotheses to theorems. This shows the limits of a purely deductive system; further
analysis requires probabilities to be assigned to hypotheses and implications.
The fourth example in Figure 2·6 comes from the fields of statistics/inverse theory,
and fits well in a deductive system due to its purely mathematical nature. It involves
examining different choices of polynomials that fit empirical data points. For this
example we make use of the notation from FOL presented earlier. Each hypothesis
is the conjunction of a law (in this case a polynomial functional relationship) and
particular values for the coefficients used in the law. On the left of Figure 2·6 we
have the hypotheses governing the functional form. In this case we are limiting the
possible hypotheses to either a first or second order polynomial. Given a choice of
polynomial order, there is an implication to a set of coefficients. In this case we only
13I have borrowed this particular example from Calcott (2011).
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allow for two possible combinations of coefficients for either the first or second order
polynomials. For L1, the first pair of coefficients, (1.15,−0.15) perfectly predicts
the x − y pairs (1, 1) and (3, 3.3), but not (2, 1.3). The second pair of coefficients,
(0.3, 0.7) perfectly predicts x − y pairs (1, 1) and (2, 1.3), but not (3, 3.3). Turning
to the second order polynomial, its triple of coefficients (1, 1,−8.7) perfectly predicts
only the x − y pair (3, 3.3), but not the others. The coefficients (0.85,−2.25, 2.4)
on the other hand perfectly predict all three of the x − y pairs. The situation we
have is that the first order polynomial for either choice of coefficients can only predict
two out of three observations. The second order polynomial can predict one pair
for one choice of coefficients, but all three observations for the other choice. These
deductions can be seen in Figure 2·6 by where the dashed lines from each of the
coefficient choices maps to in each theorem. For example, each choice of coefficients
c′ for the linear polynomial goes through two out of three of the observations. For
the second order polynomial, one choice of coefficients predicts all three of the data
points in the theorems, while the other only predicts one of them.
Again, the hypotheses in this example are whether the polynomial is first or
second order (along with the catch-all hypothesis which includes every other possible
curve that can fit the data) in conjunction with particular value of the associated
coefficients. Since we are dealing with mathematics, we have no wiggle room regarding
which theorems are predicted by a given choice of hypothesis; each hypothesis implies
an exact curve and either our observed data points will lie along it, or not. The totality
of all theorems predicted by each hypothesis can be seen by the curves in the graph
of Figure 2·7, along with where they each intersect the observed data points. This
particular example was constructed such that the each choice of hypothesis will imply
some or all of the observations.
As a purely deductive systems go, none of these examples is very illuminating.
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With the exception of the polynomial fitting problem, they are very different from
a system like ZFC, which had each theorem being deduced with 100% certainty,
and thereby adding useful information to the existing body of mathematics. In these
systems, on the other hand, hypotheses might not imply some theorems with certainty.
However, by assigning appropriate probabilities to the hypotheses, and conditional
probabilities to theorems given hypotheses, in Section 3.2, below, we will be able to
examine how probable particular theorems are, and then in Section 4.1 we will also
see how to abduce the optimal hypotheses.
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Figure 2·3: Deductive system with multiple hypotheses: Ptolemaic
versus Copernican astronomy.
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Figure 2·4: Deductive system with multiple hypotheses: Causes of
Parkinson-like symptoms. “Chemicals in hard drugs” does not have a
clear implication to whether the onset of symptoms occurs at a young
or old age, hence no arrow to either theorem.
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Figure 2·5: Deductive system with multiple hypotheses: Bob’s guilt
or innocence with respect to cheating on his wife. There is no clear
implication from the hypotheses to the theorems, hence no arrows.
This case can only be examined in a probabilistic system.
27
Figure 2·6: Deductive system with multiple hypotheses: Fitting a
polynomial of some order to observed data. Since this is a purely
mathematical example, there are clear implications from each of the
hypotheses to each of the theorems. The theorems involve observed
empirical data that lie along the curves predicted by the different poly-
nomials along with the different choices of coefficients.
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Figure 2·7: Polynomials implied by the four different hypotheses of
Figure 2·6. The curves are the predictions (theorems) that can be
deduced from each hypothesis.
Chapter 3
Induction
The second category of inference is induction. It deals with how we construct laws
that explain current observations and predict new ones. The study of induction has
been limited by the so-called problem of induction, which we will examine below. The
idea of assigning probabilities to sentences springs naturally out of induction, and we
examine different philosophical approaches to doing this.
Using Popper’s Propensity theory as a starting point, we combine probability
with logic to make a probabilistic deductive system. This allows us to analyze the
probability of deduced theorems, but also requires us to examine the problem of the
‘catch-all’ hypothesis.
Finally, we conclude by assigning probabilities to the hypotheses, along with condi-
tional probabilities of theorems given the hypotheses, for the examples in the previous
chapter, thus allowing us to calculate the unconditional probability of the theorems
being deduced.
3.1 The Problem(s) of Induction
Inductive inference is the process of using limited observations to construct a general
rule that can predict future observations. It underlies the scientific method, where a
hypothesis is proposed to explain phenomena and then tested against future obser-
vations in order to be validated. Following Peter Lipton (Lipton, 2013), the problem
of induction can be split into three related questions:
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1. How does a person create a such explanatory law ex nihilo?
2. What justification do we have that the rule should predict future observations?
3. If there are many explanatory laws that fit observations, how do we choose the
right one? (Underdetermination)
Addressing the first question, and using the notation of FOL from above, the
traditional goal of induction is to start with
(∃x1∃y1(x1 = x′1 ∧ y1 = y′1) ∧ · · · ∧ ∃xN∃yN(xN = x′N ∧ yN = y′N)) (3.1)
and arrive at
(∃c ∀x ∃y Lcxy) (3.2)
via some mechanical procedure. This is at the heart of attempts to ground inductive
inference in deductive inference. Francis Bacon, in particular, sought this kind of
approach to induction — a set of “rules”, which if followed would lead to a law for
predicting new observations (quoted from Gillies (1996, pg. 3)) :
But the course I propose for the discovery of sciences is such as leaves
but little to the acuteness and strength of wits, but places all wits and
understandings nearly on a level. For as in the drawing of a straight line
or a perfect circle, much depends on the steadiness and practice of the
hand, if it be done by aim of hand only, but if with the aid of rule or
compass, little or nothing; so it is exactly with my plan.
This was a mistake, as the failure of many decades of effort to create a formal inductive
system shows. Rather, to answer the first question above, I view this aspect of
induction as the inspirational act of creating a deductive system such that it explains
current observations, and hopefully predicts new ones to some degree of accuracy.
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In this viewpoint, induction and deduction are intricately tied together. Whereas
deductive inference is the process of deriving implications from a set of premises
along with valid implications, inductive inference is the process of constructing the
deductive system in the first place. There is no rule book to follow on how this
construction is done — or, better said, if there is such a rule book, it does not come
out of deductive inference, but is instead a capability of the mind, brain, or soul that
is best left for psychologists, neuroscientists, or theologians to study. This was the
viewpoint of Karl Popper, who said (Popper, 2013, pg. 409):
The initial stage, the act of conceiving or inventing a theory, seems
to me neither to call for logical analysis nor be susceptible of it. The
question how it happens that a new idea occurs to a man—whether it is a
musical theme, a dramatic conflict, or a scientific theory—may be of great
interest to empirical psychology; but it is irrelevant to the logical analysis
of scientific knowledge.
Whichever is the source of inductive inspiration, it is beyond the scope of my work
here. It is sufficient to say only that it can be done, and our collective experience
has shown humans able to come up with ingenious explanations that stand up to
experimental verification.
The second question above is closely related to the first: Once we have a law that
explains our current observations, what justification do we have that it will predict
future ones? A classic example of this problem is that upon observing 1000 white
swans we infer that the next swan will be white. Obviously no amount of white swans
will ever guarantee the conclusion. David Hume observed that if someone attempts to
justify induction by the fact that it has tended to work in the past, they are justifying
induction by induction itself, thus leading to a circular argument. Hume’s skeptical
conclusion was that there is no justification for it.
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My only insight is that in asking the question about the future in view of the
current uncertainty in our proposed law, it seems that the word probability naturally
arises. With probability we don’t have to justify that the law will predict with
complete certainty, but only that it will work most of the time. Although this seems
to give us a little wiggle room, it really only pushes Hume’s skeptical argument one
level back — instead of justifying a proposed inductive rule, we instead must justify
the probabilities we assign to sentences in a deductive logic. We will examine current
methods for doing this in the following section.
The final question above is closely related to the second, and stems from under-
determination, where we have many theories that can explain current observations
equally well. In order to distinguish between the different hypotheses we must have
a criterion for saying that one is better than the others. In my view this question is
not one of induction, but rather lies in the domain of abductive inference, where we
seek the best explanation for a set of observations; it will be examined in Chapter 4.
3.2 Probability
As mentioned in Chapter 2, a problem with formal deductive systems is that they can-
not handle inexactness and uncertainty. Either a sentence is implied by the premises
and implications, or it is not. This all-or-nothing viewpoint is limiting, but does not
have to be synonymous with deductive inference. The concept of probability allows
us to assign degrees of belief to premises, and conditional degrees of belief to theo-
rems given a premise, in our deductive language, thus generalizing the deterministic
concepts of certainty (probability 1) and impossibility (probability 0) to any fraction
between 0 and 1.
In his book Philosophical Theories of Probability (Gillies, 2000), Donald Gillies
gives an excellent overview of the topic from both a historical and theoretical per-
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spective. According to him, there have been five proposed theories of probability:
Classical, Logical, Subjective, Frequentist, and Propensity; to these he adds his own
Intersubjective and Pluralistic theories. The key distinctions between them all are:
1. The mathematical axioms that define the theory.
2. The semantic object being referenced by the axioms (i.e., events, attributes,
sentences, sets, etc.).
3. The justification for the values of probability being assigned to semantic objects.
4. Whether probability is an epistemic notion or an ontological one; i.e., whether
the assigned values are due to human ignorance, or are a fundamental stochastic
property of nature.
5. The status of conditional probability.
Regarding the first item, the usual approach in the applied sciences for developing
a theory of probability follows that of the famous Russian mathematician Andrey
Kolmogorov, who postulated three axioms (Hjek, 2012):
Axiom 1 (Kolmogorov) 0 ≤ P (A) for all A ∈ F .
Axiom 2 (Kolmogorov) P (Ω) = 1.
Axiom 3 (Kolmogorov) P (A ∪B) = P (A) + P (B).
For Kolmogorov the semantic objects are sets, with A and B being arbitrary sets,
Ω being the ‘universal set’, F are subsets of Ω, and ∪ signifies the union of sets.
Kolmogorov strengthened Axiom 3 to include countably infinite sets with the Axiom
of Countable Additivity:
Axiom 3′ (Kolmogorov) If A1, A2, A3, . . . is a countably infinite sequence of
disjoint sets, each of which is an element of F , then P (∪∞n=1An) =∑∞
n=1 P (An).
Although the semantics differ in different probability theories, these axioms are a
minimal group shared by all of the them, and are thus used as a reference point by
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Theory Extra Nature of Conditional Semantics
axioms Probability Probability
Kolmogorov Countable additivity N/A Definition Sets
Classical None Epistemic N/A Events
Logical Principle of Indifference Epistemic and N/A Sentences
Ontological
Subjective Countable additivity Epistemic Axiom Events
Exchangeability
Frequentist Convergence Ontological N/A Attributes
Randomness
Propensity Independent Repetitions Ontological Definition or Events
Countable additivity Axiom
FRPS
Table 3.1: A summary of the different conceptions of probability
throughout history, summarized from Gillies (2000). Each postulate
the extra axioms listed in the second column. The third column states
the metaphysical nature of probability, i.e., whether it is epistemic,
ontological, or both. The fourth column states whether conditional
probabilities are conceived by definition or as another axiom (or not at
all). The fifth column shows the semantics of the probability theory,
i.e., what is the object that receives a numerical value of probability.
Gillies. It is interesting that he does not explicitly put Kolmogorov’s view into any of
his philosophical categories. My assumption is that he instead views it as a utilitarian
approach that does not go deeply into its own philosophical foundations, but rather
has shown itself useful to the applied community. Following Gillies, I will cover the
essential properties of each theory in light of Kolmogorov’s Axioms, focusing on the
five core philosophical distinctions listed above, four of which I summarize in Table
3.1.1 For more detail I recommend the reader to Gillies’ book.
3.2.1 The Classical Theory
Up until the 1900’s, there was a common belief in universal determinism. This concept
is most clearly illustrated by the concept of Laplace’s Demon who, given the initial
conditions of reality in all it’s detail, could predict the state of the universe until
1I do not put the Intersubjective or Pluralist theories in the table; the former because it shares
the same properties as the Subjective theory, the latter because it is an amalgamation of the other
theories.
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the end of time. There was certainty that the laws of science had swept away all
superstition and now allowed us to predict the motion of objects, from particles to
planets, or any other phenomena we desired, with perfect accuracy, if only we have
the correct initial/boundary conditions. With this background it is obvious that the
concept of probability could only be an epistemic one, representing uncertainty in
the mind of an observer of an event that theoretically could be known with certainty.
Quoting Pierre-Simon Laplace from (Gillies, 2000, pg. 17):
The curve described by a simple molecule of air or vapor is regulated
in a manner just as certain as the planetary orbits; the only difference
between them is that which comes from our ignorance.
Probability is relative, in part to this ignorance, in part to our knowl-
edge. We know that of three or greater number of events a single one
ought to occur; but nothing induces us to believe that one of them will
occur rather than the others. In this state of indecision, it is impossible
for us to announce their occurrence with certainty.
Implicit in this statement is the belief that given our state of ignorance, we should
assign equal probability to each of the possible outcomes of a probabilistic scenario
— the so-called uniform distribution. Probability is then the ratio of the number of
specified events to the total number of possible events. A simple example of this, given
by Gillies, is that of calculating the probability of an odd numbered side appearing in
the roll of a six-sided die. The number of specified events is three, the total number
of possible events is six (one for each side that can come up). Thus the probability
is 3
6
= 1
2
. This view of probability persisted into the early 1900’s; even the famous
Russian mathematician, Andrei Markov, held to the classical view in his book on the
subject, published in 1912. This view, however, could not address situations such the
following, quoted by Richard Von Mises (Gillies, 2000, page 18):
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But how are we to deal with the problem of a biased die by means of a
theory which knows only probability based on a number of equally likely
results?
It should be noted that Laplace and others were aware of this problem; indeed,
Laplace examined the case of the biased coin, which seems to imply the existence of
non-uniform objective probabilities, but for whatever reason this did not lead him to
change his philosophical viewpoint.
The Classical theory also made no mention nor provided a definition of conditional
probabilities.
3.2.2 The Logical Theory
The logical view of probability came predominantly from Cambridge and to a lesser
extent from the Vienna Circle in the years before World War I. The name best associ-
ated with it is that of John Maynard Keynes. He identified probability with a degree
of partial entailment (implication). In this view all probabilities are conditional, and
only have meaning in relation to background information. Quoting Keynes from
(Gillies, 2000, page 30):
No proposition is in itself either probable or improbable, just as no
place can be intrinsically distant; and the probability of the same state-
ment varies with the evidence presented, which is, as it were, its origin of
reference.
The semantic objects that receive a probability in this theory are propositions, i.e.,
sentences.
Keynes further associates the ‘partial degree of entailment’ with the ‘degree of
rational belief’, where the rational belief is predicated on the subject’s collective
experience. He held that probabilities had a Platonic reality, and hence a true value.
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Rational people would all assign the same true value of probability to a statement,
but he also held that not all people are rational. Thus probability in his view was
both ontological (in that there was a true value), and epistemic, since not all observers
might have that true value in mind.
Regarding the assignment of probability by rational intuition, Gillies (2000, page
53) says
Frege, one of the greatest logicians of all time, was led by his logical
intuition to support the so-called axiom of comprehension, from which
Russell’s paradox follows in a few lines. Moreover, he had companions in
this error as distinguished as Dedekind and Peano. Hilbert and Brouwer
were two of the greatest mathematicians of the twentieth century. Yet
Hilbert’s logical intuition informed him that the Law of Excluded Middle
was valid in mathematics, and Brouwer’s that is was not valid. All this
indicates that logical intuition is not to be greatly trusted in the deductive
case, and so hardly at all as regards to inductive inferences.
Karl Popper also argues against Keynes’ method. Quoting from Gillies (2000,
page 31):
... Popper’s argument continues, although the degree to which finite
evidence partially entails a universal generalisation is zero, it may nonethe-
less be possible to have a non-zero degree of rational belief in a universal
generalisation given finite evidence. Indeed this is often the case when
we entertain some finite degree of rational belief in a scientific theory.
So, Popper concludes, we should not identify degree of partial entailment
with degree of rational belief. Popper accepts a logical interpretation of
probability where probability is identified with degree of partial entail-
ment, but, since these degrees of partial entailment are no longer degrees
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of rational belief, his theory differs from that of Keynes. Popper identifies
degree of rational belief with what he calls ‘degree of corroboration’....
Related to this was Popper’s belief that there should be some objective way of altering
probabilities based on observations. Such an idea was completely lacking in Keynes
theory. Popper (2010, page 398) says:
... we may learn from experience more and more about universal laws
without ever increasing their probability ; that we may test and corrobo-
rate some of them better and better, thereby increasing their degree of
corroboration without altering their probability whose value remains zero.
What I believe Popper is alluding to is that, regardless of what probabilities may be
assigned to statements, the results of empirical observations should be able to refute,
or falsify, the rationally chosen probability value. I will return to this issue in the
Frequency and Propensity theories, below.
As part of his theory, Keynes postulated a ‘Principle of Indifference’ as a way to
assign probability values to cases where we have no known reason to give one state-
ment more probability than another. This principle would equally divide probabilities
between all the possible outcomes, again leading to the uniform distribution, similar
to the Classical Theory. The difference being that in Keynes’ view this rule could
be superseded by the rational person if they believed that the sentences in question
should have a non-uniform distribution of probabilities (say, if they knew a die was
loaded). This principle, however, led to paradoxes when it was noticed that if a uni-
form distribution of probability was assigned to a continuous variable and then the
problem were re-parameterized, in the new parameterization the distribution would
no longer be uniform. The obvious question is then ‘Which parameterization is cor-
rect?’, but there is no straightforward answer to that question. Thus in cases of
continuous variables there is no objectively correct way to assign probability; a bias
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is introduced by rational agents who may think they are being as unbiased as possi-
ble by choosing the uniform distribution. For examples of paradoxes arising from the
Principle of Indifference, see, e.g., (Gillies, 2000, pp. 37-42).
Keynes also held that not all probabilities have numerical values. Sometimes we
can only give comparative rankings of sentences. For instance, we can’t assign a
probability to the sentence “The USA will go to war with Iran in the next 10 years.”,
or the statement “The USA will go to war with Canada in the next 10 years.”, yet
most people would rank the probability of the former as being higher than the latter.
3.2.3 The Subjective Theory
The unsuccessful resolution of the paradoxes arising from the Principle of Indifference
led investigators to seek an alternative formulation of probability, which they found in
the Subjectivist viewpoint. The original proponents of this view were Frank Ramsey
in Cambridge and Bruno de Finetti in Italy, who discovered it independently. In
this view we abandon the idea that all rational individuals will have access to some
Platonic reality regarding the values of probability. Rather, each person has their own
subjective value which they are quite entitled to assign to an event — the semantic
object referred to by the theory. The main argument for how an individual should
assign probabilities in the Subjective viewpoint revolves around the concept of betting
quotients (Gillies, 2000, pp. 55-58), i.e., a person should assign their probabilities as
if they were going to bet according to the odds they implied. Quoting Ramsey in
(Gillies, 2000, pg. 54):
The old-established way of measuring a person’s belief is to propose a
bet, and see what are the lowest odds which he will accept. This method
I regard as fundamentally sound.
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The subjectivists were able to show that their approach satisfies Kolmogorov’s ax-
ioms. They did this through the idea of ‘coherence’, which essentially says that when
assigning probabilities, a rational agent won’t do it in such a way that they are guar-
anteed to lose, i.e., a Dutch book cannot be made against them. The Ramsey-De
Finetti Theorem then says that a set of betting quotients is coherent (i.e., doesn’t
allow a Dutch book) if and only if it satisfies Kolmogorov’s axioms. Gillies (2000, pp.
59-63) provides the proof of this theorem.
A crucial difference between the Subjectivist view and Kolmogorov’s is how to
interpret conditional probabilities. Kolmogorov viewed them as being defined as the
ratio between probabilities:
P (B|A) := P (A ∩B)
P (A)
(3.3)
Where ∩ signifies the intersection of two sets.
Ramsey and de Finetti, on the other hand, have conditional probability as being
a fundamental notion requiring it’s own axiom:
P (A ∩B) = P (A)P (B|A) (3.4)
A further technical difference is whether or not probabilities can, and should,
be applied to countably infinite events. Kolmogorov said ‘yes’ (which required his
additional axiom for handling such a case), while de Finetti, citing the fact that all
bets are made with finite number of options, said ‘no’. This difference, however,
is more a difference between de Finetti and Kolmogorov, rather than one between
Kolmogorov and subjectivists in general, as there are many subjectivists who do, in
fact, allow for applying probabilities to countable sets.
Whereas the Logical approach to probability associated it with degree of rational
belief and its access to a Platonic reality, the Subjective theory associated it with
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degree of belief — period. The Subjective view then was epistemic, which set it apart
from the Logical view that allowed probability to be objective. Although the Subjec-
tivist viewpoint seems to have solid grounding via the Ramsey-De Finetti Theorem,
it does not account for cases where there actually seem to be objective probabilities
such as, e.g., the probability of fair coin coming up as ‘heads’ half the time. De
Finetti’s answer to this would be that we may assign any degree of subjective prob-
ability we wish; with each flip of the coin the subjective prior will then be modified
into a new probability via Bayes rule (Chapter 4, below), and rather quickly the effect
of whichever subjective probability was originally used would disappear.
There is a subtle problem here though, that Gillies goes to great lengths to point
out: De Finetti’s Subjective theory relies on an idea of exchangeability, the subjec-
tivist’s notion that any events being considered are independent of each other. Upon
observation, the subjectivist can only modify prior probabilities into posterior ones
by Bayes rule, but can never modify the hypothesis that the sequence of events is in-
dependent. Thus, if probabilities of the events are indeed dependent, the subjectivist
will never arrive at accurate values of probability, regardless of how much Bayesian
conditionalization goes on. Gillies (2000, pg. 74 and 80) says
In De Finetti’s scheme, we do not try to test or refute our prior prob-
abilities . . . , we simply change them into posterior probabilities . . . by
Bayesian conditionalisation.
Yet if we assume exchangeability a priori when the sequence of events
is in reality dependent, no amount of modifying our prior probabilities
. . . to posterior probabilities . . . by Bayesian conditionalisation will pro-
duce probabilities which accord with the real situation . . . Unless we know
that the events are objectively independent, we have no guarantee that
the use of exchangeability will lead to reasonable results.
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De Finetti’s answer to the problem worked only because he was talking about events
that truly are independent, such as the coin flipping experiment.
What we are seeing here is that the Subjective theory has a similar problem to
that of the Logical theory with respect to the interaction between assigned proba-
bilities and empirical observations. Whereas there was no mechanism for modifying
probabilities in the Logical theory, the Subjective method does have Bayes rule. How-
ever, that is not enough. There is a deeper hypothesis hard-wired into the Subjective
theory that cannot be changed, even if it would allow for better conditionalization.
This situation would be analogous to the inductive problem of creating a hypothesis
to explain observations where we are not free to choose the best one. This issue will
appear again in the Frequency theory, but does not have a resolution until we examine
the Propensity theory, below.
In his book, Gillies also covers an Intersubjective view of probability, which is
almost identical to the Subjective view — the only difference being that the ‘sub-
ject’ who defines probabilities via betting quotients in the Intersubjective theory is a
group, not an individual. All other properties and axioms remain the same. If the
Subjective viewpoint is plausible, then so is the Intersubjective one. One could view
Intersubjective probabilities as being part of a paradigm, in the Kuhnian sense. Since
there are no further differences between the Subjective and Intersubjective view, I
will not cover it further.
3.2.4 The Frequency Theory
The Frequentist approach is most closely associated in philosophy with Hans Re-
ichenbach and Richard Von Mises of the Vienna Circle. It’s distinguishing mark is
the fact that probabilities are obtained from collections of events that have attributes
in common. For instance, in flipping a coin, the attributes are that 1) A coin is
flipped, and 2) It came up ‘heads’. One can then compare ratios of events where
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both 1 and 2 occurred to those where only 1 occurred. In this way the Frequentist
approach carries within it what Gillies calls the ‘Axiom of Convergence’, which says
that as the number of samples goes to infinity, the limit of the ratio of attributes ex-
ists. Von Mises’ justification for this axiom comes from the empirical sciences, where
exactly this thing is done, i.e., scientific theories are (hopefully) true generalizations
to infinite collections that can be obtained from finite samples. We see here another
hint that the problem of assigning probability is close to, if not equivalent with, the
problem of induction.
Frequentist probabilities are obtained from a finite number of samples for a finite
number of attributes. Therefore the theory does not need Kolmogorov’s axiom of
Countable Additivity, since it would imply human experience with infinite numbers of
attributes. The Frequency theory therefore deals with infinite collections samples only
in a hypothetical way, i.e., that if given an infinite number of samples of attributes,
there would be convergence to a probability value.
In order to make a coherent theory Von Mises’ required an additional axiom called
the Axiom of Randomness, which has no counterpart in Kolmogorov’s system. It
states that there can be no order in a collection of samples from which we calculate a
ratio; i.e., by selecting a subset of the samples the ratio should not change very much.
Otherwise, if samples are not random then there exists some dependence of one sample
on another, and selecting dependent samples can bias the resulting empirical ratio.
Randomness of the sequence of samples therefore implies their independence and our
ability to calculate frequencies. The Axiom of Randomness then plays the same role
as the principle of exchangeability did in the Subjective theory.
Probability in the Frequentist view is always conditional, similar to the Logical
viewpoint. It is conditional precisely on the existence of the collection of samples
from which it obtains its value; i.e., values of conditional probability will be obtained
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by an empirical ratio approximating Equation 3.3. Thus we must limit ourselves to
the case where P (A) = limn→∞
n(A)
n
6= 0 in order to make such a calculation. This,
however, leads to problems in situations where we may wish to ascribe probabilities
when not even a single sample exists, e.g., the probability of the USA going to war
with Canada in the next 10 years. Regarding this point, Von Mises says (Gillies,
2000):
‘The probability of winning a battle’, for instance, has no place in our
theory of probability, because we cannot think of a collective to which it
belongs. The theory of probability cannot be applied to this problem any
more than the physical concept of work can be applied to the calculation
of the ‘work’ done by an actor in reciting his part in a play.
3.2.5 The Propensity Theory
The aim of the Propensity theory was to overcome the main philosophical problem
associated with the Frequency theory, namely that of assigning a probability to a
singular event. Karl Popper, the original proponent, saw that the change needed to
correct the Frequency theory was to abandon the idea of a collective from which to
draw inference, and instead speak about a set of generating conditions that had a
propensity or disposition to produce the collective.
I stated above that the problem of justification for induction could be kicked back
to the problem of justifying the assignment of probabilities. The Propensity theory’s
answer to this problem is paradoxically the same answer as to how someone creates
a hypothesis ex nihilo to explain data — which is to say, there is no answer — or at
least not one that comes from any rational principle I am aware of. In the Propensity
theory the probability assignment must be created ex nihilo, also. Again, I offer
no insight into how this is done, but once it is done we can then test how well the
probabilities predict. The way to interpret this is that as we obtain more empirical
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samples we can calculate ratios as we do with Frequency theory. To the extent that
the predictions corroborate the assigned probabilities, we retain them. To the extent
they don’t, they are falsified, and we must come up with another assignment. Gillies
agrees with this assessment, saying (Gillies, 2000, page 160):
The propensity theory . . . does not offer an explicit definition of prob-
ability from which the [Kolmogorov] axioms can be derived. It rather
regards probability as implicitly characterised by a set of axioms which
are designed to provide a mathematical theory of observed random phe-
nomena. The axioms are justified by showing that from them results can
be derived which are in agreement with observation.
Gillies advocates an absolute test for falsification, which he calls the ‘Falsifying Rule
for Probability Statements’ (FRPS). It basically amounts to something like a χ2-type
test, where if an observation occurs whose probability under the assumed probability
assignment is very small, the assignment is falsified. The question is then ‘How small
is too small?’, which has no absolute answer. I return to this idea in the context of
Deborah Mayo’s “error-statistics” approach below in Section 4.2.
From the perspective of someone familiar with statistics, what the Propensity
method is saying is that one must come up with some kind of parametric model of
possible outcomes of an experiment that generalizes beyond the current collection of
empirical samples. Then one continues to collect empirical samples and as long as
empirical ratios approximately match the parametric model, the model is retained.
If they don’t, another model must replace it. In this way we see that the method of
assignment of probabilities inherent in the Propensity theory is exactly the scientific
method: propose a hypothesis (in this case the hypothesis is the assignment of prob-
abilities), collect data, and see if the data falsifies the hypothesis (where falsification
is in a statistical sense of comparing empirical ratios with the probabilities).
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Returning to the Frequency theory, we see there that it made assignments based
of past experience, i.e., by taking empirical samples from the past and calculating
ratios related to a particular attribute. This seems to me to be good for explanation,
i.e., finding the probability that is most consistent with the empirical ratios that we
used to derive it, but it is not predictive. The Propensity theory then makes the
inductive leap to generalize and predict ratios for unobserved attributes.
The Propensity theory also subsumes the Subjective theory in the sense that the
inspirational creative act of assigning probabilities is subjective — different people
will do it in different ways. The difference is that the Propensity theory says that
there exists a true assignment that best explains all possible future observations,
whereas the Subjective theory says such a thing does not exist.
The Propensity theory also handles the problems of independence/exchangeability
in both the Subjective and Frequency theories by re-defining what constitutes a sam-
ple as part of its assignment of probabilities. Practically speaking, this means that if
we have a sequence of observations where each group of five is assumed to be proba-
bilistically dependent, we can account for this by assuming a probabilistic model that
has exactly that characteristic. Then, when making observations we must break up
the sequence accordingly and treat each group of five as a separate ‘sample’ for pur-
poses of calculating empirical statistics. If the assumption was wrong — say, there
are actually groups of six dependent samples at a time — we can make alternate
proposals and compare to see which one best fits the empirical data. This solution,
we recall, could not be done with either the Subjective or Frequency theories. Gillies
calls this requirement of only using independent collections the ‘Axiom of Indepen-
dent Repetitions’. It seems straightforward —almost trivial — so much so that I
would personally not include it as an axiom, but rather as simple common sense.
Finally, the Axiom of Countable Additivity is also justified by the Propensity
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theory, since we can propose any number of probabilistic objects we wish, as long as
the resulting theory is supported by observations.
Summarizing its superior properties, Gillies makes it clear that he sees the Propen-
sity theory as the best among the different views of probability (Gillies, 2000, pg.
184):
The propensity theory . . . explains conceptual innovation in the natu-
ral sciences better than Von Mises’ operationalism; the propensity theory
eliminates all the problems about infinite collectives, and, by introduc-
ing a falsifying rule for probability statements, gives an account of the
relations between probability and frequency which agrees very well with
the standard statistical practice; the propensity theory eliminates Von
Mises’ introduction of the two separate concepts of randomness and in-
dependence by reducing both to independence; the propensity theory fits
in better with the Kolmogorov axioms and the modern mathematical ap-
proach to probability using measure theory, since it allows probability to
be introduced as an undefined concept; and so on. Taking all these points
together, I think we can definitely say that the propensity theory has
superseded the frequency theory.
I find it hard to disagree with Gillies on his points, and I see the Propensity theory
as the best basis for assigning probabilities.
3.2.6 A Modified Propensity Theory
Gillies maintains that only the Subjective, Propensity, and Intersubjective theories
are viable (which I agree with). He claims that since two are epistemic theories and
the other ontological, they need not contradict with each other and could be applied in
different situations. He proposes this as the basis for a Pluralistic theory in which he
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uses different theories in different contexts. Since the Propensity theory can account
for every aspect of probability necessary for practical application, I see the other
two theories as being superfluous. I do not understand why Gillies sees the need to
retain them and mesh them into a more complicated Pluralist theory. I therefore
depart from Gillies, and I view the Propensity theory as being appropriate to handle
any probabilistic situation (whereas the other theories are lacking in one respect or
another). The Propensity theory has the structure of a science, where its hypotheses
(the probability values) are empirically tested and can be falsified. Subjectivity enters
into it through the subjective choice that individuals can propose for the probabilities
— either individually, or as a group. Frequencies enter through empirical testing. How
to actually assign probabilities will depend on the application; when there appear to
be objective probabilities, they should be used. If the probabilities are related to an
empirical phenomenon, examining data for statistical patterns might be a good place
to start. If they involve a naturally occurring range of possibilities (two sides of a
coin, six sides of dice, etc.), a uniform distribution on the possibilities may be a good
place to start. If they involve an occurrence with no empirical data or obvious choices,
intuitive insight from similar past experience may point the way. The hypotheses and
probabilities generated in this way will stand until they can be shown to be inferior
to another competing set of hypotheses and/or probabilities.
Although this method seems to provide a rational approach that covers all aspects
of probability, it assigns probability to ‘events’, which I believe is incorrect. Ascribing
it to sentences, as the Keynes’ Logical theory does, seems more general than ascribing
it to either events, attributes, or sets, and thereby makes probability a context-
free theory. There also seem to be cases where a sentence can have a legitimate
probability assigned to it, even though it doesn’t classify as an ‘event’ or a ‘set’,
e.g., ‘the probability of the existence of God’, ‘the probability of the law of excluded
middle’, ‘the probability of a tautology’, ‘the probability of a contradiction’, or ‘the
probability of the axioms of ZFC’. These are not measurable occurrences in space-time
(i.e., an ‘event’) or collections of things (i.e., a ‘set’), but we could place a probability
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on the statements, if we wished. Thus in my view it is more appropriate to assign a
probability to a collection of symbols that refers to an object in our mind, which then
(hopefully) refers to an object in reality. Assigning probabilities to sentences allows
one to apply it to a logical deductive system, thus resulting in a probabilistic logic. I
develop this here, beginning with a re-statement of Kolmogorov’s axioms, and having
conditional probability included as an additional axiom:
Axiom 1 Every probability is a real number between 0 and 1: 0 ≤
P (A) ≤ 1.
Axiom 2 If A is a necessary truth (i.e., a tautology), then P (A) = 1.
Axiom 3 If A and B are mutually exclusive (that is, ¬(A ∧B) is a tau-
tology), then P (A ∨ B) = P (A) + P (B). (Special Addition
Rule).
Axiom 4 Conditional Probability2
P (H ∧ T ) = P (H)P (T |H)
A and B here are sentences.
From these axioms we can deduce the following theorems:
Theorem 1: Negation Rule3
P (¬A) = 1− P (A)
Theorem 2: Equivalence Rule4
If A and B are logically equivalent, then P (A) = P (B).
2I originally investigated an alternate way of arriving at conditional probabilities. I made the
assumption that a premise is probabilistically independent of an implication involving the premise,
which would allow for the following relationship:
P (H ∧ (H → T )) = P (H)P (H → T ) (3.5)
= P (H ∧ T ) (3.6)
William Rodi, one of the readers of this thesis, pointed out that this would lead to a paradox if ¬H
were substituted for T ; this would say that P (H)P (¬H) = P (H ∧ ¬H) = 0, thus implying that
either P (H) = 0 or P (¬H) = 0. This, in turn, would render probability theory intractable. The
conclusion seems to be that the probability of a hypothesis is not independent of the probability of
an implication involving it, and therefore P (H → T ) 6= P (T |H), i.e., the probability of a conditional
is not equal to the conditional probability.
3A ∨ ¬A is a tautology, thus we have that 1 = P (A ∨ ¬A) = P (A) + P (¬A). Rearranging gives
the theorem.
4A↔ B implies that A∨¬B is a tautology, so P (A∨¬B) = 1. Since A and ¬B are contradictory
statements we have that P (A∨¬B) = P (A)+P (¬B). From this we have that P (A)+1−P (B) = 1,
and thus that P (A) = P (B).
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Theorem 3: General Addition Rule5
P (A ∨B) = P (A) + P (B)− P (A ∧B)
3.2.7 Syntactic Elegance and Objective Probability
Although I believe my Modified Propensity theory is a valid approach to probability,
there is one other viewpoint that may offer an improvement, and should be mentioned.
It involves the idea that probabilities can be objectively assigned to sentences based
on their syntax. The shorter the syntax, the more ‘elegant’ the description, and
hence the more probable the sentence is. Elegance is then one of two conceptions of
the theoretical virtue of simplicity found in the literature (the other, ‘parsimony’, is
examined in Section 4.1.1, below). The use of elegance has appeared independently
in a several different areas of mathematics and computer science in the past century
— most notably in the Minimum Description Length Principle (Gru¨nwald, 2007),
Kolmogorov Complexity (Li and Vita´nyi, 2009), Algorithmic Probability (Solomonoff,
1997), as well as in Algorithmic Complexity (Chaitin, 2003, 1975). Kolmogorov,
in particular, sought to define computational complexity in terms of the smallest
(i.e., the most elegant) string of instructions in some language that can be used to
reconstruct another string. If the language is FOL, and the given string is a list of
formulas, Kolmogorov’s goal would then be to try to find the most elegant set of
axioms from which we can derive those formulas. The sad fact is that finding the
smallest such set of axioms is an undecidable question. There is no way to know if the
current set of axioms is the most elegant by any mechanical method. It is also known
that the shortest length of a formula is language dependent; as alluded to above, some
formal languages may be better for describing certain concepts than others.
5We have that (A ∨ B) ↔ (A ∧ ¬B) ∨ (¬A ∧ B) ∨ (A ∧ B), A ↔ (A ∧ ¬B) ∨ (A ∧ B), and
B ↔ (¬A∧B)∨ (A∧B). This, in turn, gives us P (A∨B) = P (A∧¬B) +P (¬A∧B) +P (A∧B),
P (A) = P (A ∧ ¬B) + P (A ∧ B), P (B) = P (¬A ∧ B) + P (A ∧ B), respectively. Combining these
three terms and rearranging gives the theorem.
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Thus although the idea of using elegance to objectively assign probabilities to
sentences is intriguing, it is beyond the scope of this current work to evaluate. I leave
it as a item for future study, and I see it as the frontier of probability theory.
3.2.8 A Paradox?
Probability theory speaks of numbers (probabilities) and functions (the probability
assignment operator P ); in order to use those terms we must already have accepted
ZFC as a deductive system, since ZFC derives those concepts as theorems. Yet, if our
framework allows all formal deductive systems to be viewed as probabilistic logics, we
have a potential problem if we place a probability of less than 1 on any of the ZFC
axioms. This would cascade a probability of less than 1 down to any theorem implied
by it. For the sake of argument, let’s assume that an axiom (say, the Axiom Schema
of Restricted Comprehension) was given a probability of 0.8 which then implies that
there is a probability 0.8 that such a thing as a function exists. We now try to assign
probabilities with P to a statement (say, again, to the Axiom of Schema of Restricted
Comprehension that we started with), but now we have that the probability of the
axiom having a probability of 0.8 is itself 0.8! Our deductive tree is no longer a tree,
but a loop. This self-referential iteration would then continue forever, and it would
seem to imply that, due to the effect of multiplying probabilities of less than one,
that our final probability for both the axiom and its theorems would be 0.
How does one handle this? Does it even make any sense? The only way out of this
that I can see is the obvious one: we are simply not allowed to assign probabilities
other than 0 or 1 to the axioms of ZFC. I am not sure if this is a peculiarity of ZFC,
or if perhaps the same problem and solution would exist for other axiomatic systems
(say, perhaps the logical axioms of FOL themselves....?). I have not analyzed this
issue any further, but it is interesting question for future research.
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3.3 Probabilistic Deduction and the Problem of the Catch-
all Hypothesis
With the concept of probability we can add more structure to a logical language
by looking at the probability of deduced theorems. This can be seen in the follow-
ing two theorems related to conditional probability which we derive from the above
axioms:
Theorem 4: Total Probability Rule
P (T ) = P (H)P (T |H) + P (¬H)P (T |¬H)
Theorem 5: Total Probability Rule (Multiple Mutually Exclusive
Hypotheses)6
P (T ) =
∑
j P (Hj)P (T |Hj)
These theorems tell us how to calculate the probability of a theorem in a probabilistic
deductive system given the probability of each hypothesis as well as the conditional
probability of the theorem given that the hypothesis is true; if we have all the required
probabilities, we can calculate the value of P (T ). The problem comes, however, with
what is known as the ‘catch-all’ hypothesis. This is the ¬H term in Theorem 4 and
represents every possible hypothesis other than H. In some applications we know
exactly what the possible options are; e.g., the hypothesis that it will rain tomorrow
and its negation (that it won’t rain), or else the hypothesis that a coin will come up
heads and its negation (that it will come up tails). In other cases ¬H includes every
possible hypothesis that might explain observations other than the ones which have
been thought of so far. Such is the case in the philosophy of science where we might
wish to assign probabilities to a scientific hypothesis. Salmon states that this would
amount to assigning probabilities to all other scientific theories, including those that
6To derive this theorem we assume that H1, H2, . . . ,HM are mutually exclusive hypotheses, then
take the following tautology T ↔ T ∧ (H1∨H2∨· · ·∨HM ), distribute through with the conjunction,
and apply theorems 2 and 3 to get P (T ) = P (T ∧H1) +P (T ∧H2) + · · ·+P (T ∧HM ). From above
we have that P (T ) = P (H1)P (T |H1) + P (H2)P (T |H2) + · · · + P (HM )P (T |HM ). This derivation
obviously applies to the previous theorem, also.
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haven’t been thought of yet (Curd et al., 2013, pg. 535); which seems to imply having
knowledge of the future of science. If, however, we are able to assign probabilities to all
possible formulas based on their syntax, as we considered above in Section 3.2.7, then
this might actually be possible. Since we are using a formal language, and the number
of possible well-formed formulas in the language is countable, the question becomes
whether or not we can distribute probabilities over a countable set in such a way that
the sum remains finite. If this were feasible, then by first assigning probabilities to
the hypotheses being actively considered based on their syntax, one could then sum
their probabilities and subtract from 1, thereby calculating the probability of the
catch-all. Regarding the total probability not summing to 1, an approximation that
would make this feasible would be to simply truncate the list of possible expressions
in the language beyond some subjectively pre-determined maximum string length.
This is ad-hoc, but might prove itself effective for approximating P (¬H).
Although theoretically interesting, it is actually a moot point whether or not
P (¬H) can be calculated, since this is only half the problem. In order to calculate
P (T ) we would still need to to assign a probability to P (T |¬H), which is even more
intractable. Since we have not used an inductive process to create the hypotheses
contained in the catch-all, we have no idea whether an observation is implied by ¬H,
or not. In the example of Ptolemaic versus Copernican astronomy, this would be like
asking the question whether a yet-to-be-thought-of hypothesis predicts parallax of the
stars. We cannot say what the conditional probability of theorems of a hypothesis
would be without knowing what the hypothesis is. My conclusion is that this problem
is utterly intractable and fundamentally limits our ability to analyze the probability
of theorems, even if a probability could be assigned to P (¬H). Since there appears
to be no solution, a simple and straight-forward alternative is to ignore the catch-all
hypothesis and assume we only have the hypotheses we have formulated. In this case
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we can remove the catch-all term, distribute the total probability over the remaining
hypotheses, plug in values for the other probabilities in Theorem 5, and calculate the
value of P (T ). Technically, this will not give us a value of probability (since it is
incomplete); it will, however, effectively rank the theorems and show us which ones
are more likely than the others. Thus we see that except for the special case where
we actually have probabilities legitimately assigned to all hypotheses, and related
conditional probabilities assigned to theorems given that hypotheses are true, the
absolute probability of a theorem is not a well-defined concept.
3.4 Examples
We will now show what the deductive systems from Section 2.3 look like when prob-
abilities are assigned to both premises, and to theorems conditioned on premises. We
first present the assignment of probabilities in tables, and then express them graphi-
cally via the thicknesses of bounding boxes and arrows in Figures 3·1 through 3·4. In
contrast to the Figures in Section 2.3, here the thickness of an arrow is proportional
to the conditional probability of a theorem given a premise, and the thickness of a
bounding box is proportional the probability of a theorem or hypothesis. P (T ) will
be greater when either the probability of a hypothesis from which it is deduced, or the
conditional probability that connects the hypothesis and theorem, or both, is large.
I assign the probabilities arbitrarily; for the purposes of these examples it is not rel-
evant how this was done. The goal, rather, is to show how probabilistic logic can
handle formal inference in a variety of applications including philosophy of science,
law, medicine, and statistics.
The first example returns to the case of competing theories of astronomy, and is
shown in Figure 3·1, with the corresponding values in Table 3.2. There are three
possible hypotheses: Ptolemaic, Copernican, as well as the catch-all. We ignore the
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catch-all hypothesis, and begin with the Ptolemaic theory (H1). It predicts that
there will probably not be any observed parallax (¬T1), it also predicts the motion of
planets with high likelihood (T2), and it asserts that there should be little variation
in brightness of planets throughout the year (¬T3), again with high likelihood. The
Copernican hypothesis (H2), on the other hand, predicts T1, T2, and T3, all with
high likelihood, although T1 with slightly lower likelihood since it maintained the
possibility that stars were so far away that parallax would not be detectible. The fact
that both hypotheses have small conditional probabilities to observe the opposite of
what they should predict is due observational error, e.g., the naked eye of a Ptolemaic
astronomer could mistakenly observe parallax when it really isn’t there. Ptolemaic
and Copernican hypotheses are assumed to have the same a priori probability. This
is shown by giving them both moderately thick bounding boxes, signifying a value of
0.5 each. Based on the probabilities, the values in the bottom part of Table 3.2 are
derived using Theorem 5. These numbers show the relative degrees of probability of
the various theorems and their negations. T2 has the highest values (99%) because
both theories are capable of predicting planetary motion to a high degree. The second
most probable theorem is that there is no observed parallax (¬T1). This is predicted
by Ptolemaic astronomy, but is slightly unlikely under the Copernican view. The
third most probable theorem is the lack of varying brightness of planets during their
motion in the sky. It is slightly in favor of ¬T3 over T3 because the Ptolemaic view
is slightly stronger in its certainty than the Copernican one. (Again, this is just for
illustrative purposes; in reality these probabilities may have been very different.)
The next example returns to the medical diagnosis of the cause of Parkinson-
like symptoms. Figure 3·2 shows the same information as Figure 2·4, but with the
additional information in the form of the thickness of the bounding boxes and arrows.
The causal hypotheses are: H1, the Parkinson gene, H2, Lewy bodies in neurons in the
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Substantia Nigra, and H3, chemicals in drugs used by addicts. T1 says that symptoms
appearing at a young age, T2 is the sudden onset of symptoms. In this case we have
that some hypotheses have greater prior probability that others. In particular, having
a Parkinson gene is rarer than the normal development of Lewy bodies in the neurons
of the brain. The case of chemicals in hard drugs is an even rarer occurrence than
the Parkinson gene. This information is reflected in the sizes of the bounding boxes
around the three hypotheses. The conditional probabilities also differ; as mentioned
in Section 2.3, the ‘chemicals in drugs’ explanation only has the characteristic of
‘sudden onset’ in T2. Thus this theorem has a conditional probability of 1, and the
conditional probability of its negation is 0 (and therefore no arrow is drawn to that
possible outcome). A similar situation holds for the ‘Lewy body’ hypothesis and the
prediction of symptoms appearing at a young age. The most probable theorems in
this case are having symptoms appear with slow onset in older patients. This makes
intuitive sense, since the most likely cause a priori is that there are Lewy bodies in
the neurons of the Substantia Nigra, which usually implies these theorems with high
likelihood.
The third example comes from the situation where Bob is potentially cheating
on his wife. Again, this example relates to determining the guilt or innocence of an
accused party, and thus has applications to law. We show graphically in Figure 3·3
the information from Table 3.4. The causal hypotheses are: H1, Bob is cheating on
her, or H2, a constellation of other hypotheses exonerate Bob from wrong-doing. The
theorems are: T1, Bob was seen at a bar with another woman, T2 , Bob had lipstick on
his collar when he got home from work, and T3 , that Bob had a large un-explained bill
with a jeweler. The observations are equally possible, but very unlikely, under either
of the hypotheses, hence they have low conditional probabilities. This can intuitively
be understood as follows: If Bob is cheating, he will probably be covering his tracks,
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and thus it is unlikely he will be seen in a bar with his mistress, or come home with
lipstick on his collar, or have a large bill with a jeweler. If he is not cheating, the
probability is equally unlikely any of those things will occur for obvious reasons. Thus
in this case the most probable theorems are the negations ¬T1, ¬T2, and ¬T3. The
only visibly interesting feature in the figure is the fact that Bob’s alternate hypothesis
(of not cheating) is much more complicated than the simple ‘cheating’ one. In fact,
since it contains more sub-hypotheses, it is less parsimonious (Section 4.1.1, below),
and will thus have lower prior probability. Since the observations will do nothing
to determine Bob’s guilt or innocence because of their equal likelihoods, we can see
that Bob will be determined to be guilty solely on the fact that his explanation for
the observations is more convoluted than the simple hypothesis of him cheating (see
Section 4.3, below).
The final example returns to the case of polynomial fitting. We have limited
ourselves to only two possibilities for each polynomial for both theoretical reasons,
and for clear exposition7. We note that the probability of L1 is higher than L2, since
it is syntactically simpler (more elegant). I arbitrarily set the conditional probability
of the coefficients given the choice any polynomial to the value 0.5. The possible
coefficients have been carefully chosen to match the theorems. In Figure 2·6 an
implication arrow only came from a set of coefficients to one or the other of the
choices in each theorem (either T or ¬T ). We relax this constraint now, since we can
assign probabilities to any x−y pair from any set of coefficients; the further away the
x− y pair is from the normally predicted value, the lower its conditional probability.
7In real applications there may be a continuous distribution of possible coefficient values. Since
every example presented so far has only had a finite number of hypotheses and a finite number
of implications arising from a hypothesis, accounting for a countable number would move us into
a more complicated regime. We would have to examine whether all the axioms can be extended
to infinite collections sentences. Since that would be a daunting task and out of the scope of this
work, I take the prudent path, and limit this case of polynomial fitting to a very small number of
hypotheses and theorems.
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Thus we have more arrows in Figure 3·4 than in Figure 2·6. In Table 3.5 we have
assigned much higher conditional probabilities to the negations of theorems. This is
again due to the fact that we are allowing the possibility of many x− y observations
to be consistent with a single set of coefficients. Thus there may be more total
probability distributed to the disjunction of other possible x − y pairs than to the
most likely one predicted by a pair coefficients for a given polynomial. This, in turn,
makes the negations of the theorems more probable than the theorems themselves in
the case of polynomial fitting.
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P (H) P (T |H) T1 ¬T1 T2 ¬T2 T3 ¬T3
0.5 H1 0.01 0.99 0.99 0.01 0.01 0.99
0.5 H2 0.6 0.4 0.99 0.01 0.95 0.05
P (T ) T1 ¬T1 T2 ¬T2 T3 ¬T3
0.305 0.695 0.99 0.01 0.48 0.52
Table 3.2: Top table: probabilities of scientific hypotheses and con-
ditional probabilities for observed astronomical phenomena given the
hypotheses. Bottom table: probabilities of theorems calculated using
Theorem 5 with the values above.
Figure 3·1: A graphical representation of the information in Table
3.2.
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P (H) P (T |H) T1 ¬T1 T2 ¬T2
0.05 H1 0.8 0.2 0.1 0.9
0.94 H2 0.1 0.9 0.01 0.99
0.01 H3 0.5 0.5 1.0 0.0
P (T ) T1 ¬T1 T2 ¬T2
0.139 0.861 0.244 0.9756
Table 3.3: Top table: probabilities of hypotheses and conditional
probabilities given the hypotheses related to Parkinson-like symptoms.
Bottom table: probabilities of theorems calculated using Theorem 5
with the values above.
Figure 3·2: A graphical representation of the information in Table
3.3.
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P (H) P (T |H) T1 ¬T1 T2 ¬T2 T3 ¬T3
0.75 H1 0.2 0.8 0.1 0.9 0.01 0.99
0.25 H2 0.2 0.8 0.1 0.9 0.01 0.99
P (T ) T1 ¬T1 T2 ¬T2 T3 ¬T3
0.2 0.8 0.1 0.9 0.01 0.99
Table 3.4: Top table: probabilities of hypotheses and conditional
probabilities given the hypotheses related to the possibility of Bob
cheating on his wife. Bottom table: probabilities of theorems calcu-
lated using Theorem 5 with the values above.
Figure 3·3: A graphical representation of the information in Table
3.4.
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P (L) P (c|L) c1 c2
0.75 L1 0.5 0.5
0.25 L2 0.5 0.5
P (L ∧ c) P (T |L ∧ c) T1 ¬T1 T2 ¬T2 T3 ¬T3
0.375 L1 ∧ c1 0.2 0.8 0.2 0.8 0.01 0.99
0.375 L1 ∧ c2 0.01 0.99 0.2 0.8 0.2 0.8
0.125 L2 ∧ c2 0.01 0.99 0.01 0.99 0.2 0.8
0.125 L2 ∧ c1 0.2 0.8 0.2 0.8 0.2 0.8
P (T ) T1 ¬T1 T2 ¬T2 T3 ¬T3
0.105 0.895 0.176 0.824 0.129 0.871
Table 3.5: In this case we must split our hypotheses into postulated
laws and the coefficients each law implies. Top table: prior probabilities
on the laws and the conditional probabilities of the coefficients related
to polynomials. Middle table: prior probabilities on the conjunctions of
the laws and their coefficients, along with the likelihoods of observations
of empirical data given each hypothesis. Bottom table: probabilities of
theorems calculated using Theorem 5 with the values above.
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Figure 3·4: A graphical representation of the information in Table
3.5.
Chapter 4
Abduction
Abduction is the third category of inference; it is inference to the optimal explanation
of a potentially underdetermined system, sometimes referred to as “reasoning back-
wards”. It is the kind of inference usually associated with statisticians and inverse
theorists in the applied sciences, who, rather than deducing theorems or discover-
ing laws of nature, seek to devise methods for choosing an optimal hypothesis that
explains the data from a set of possible choices. It has the most uncertain status
among the three categories of inference. It resembles deduction in the sense that,
given enough observations and constraints in the system, one can deduce a unique
optimal hypothesis. It resembles induction in that there must be an act of inspiration
in order to create a set of possible hypotheses to choose from and assign probabilities,
and thereby constrain the system enough to allow deduction.
Using the framework of probabilistic logic I will show that the optimal abductive
hypothesis falls out naturally in the form of Bayes rule. I will examine a couple
of common criticisms of the Bayesian paradigm — specifically I will return to the
problem of the ‘catch-all’ hypothesis in the abductive setting, and then look at the
Problem of Auxiliary Hypotheses. I next apply Bayes theorem to the same examples
from Chapters 2 and 3, and examine the results.
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4.1 Bayesian inference
In the framework of probabilistic logic, the abductive solution is an almost trivial
deduction from the axioms and theorems of Chapter 3. Using the axiom of conditional
probability again we have:
P (T ∧H) = P (T )P (H|T ) (4.1)
Combining this with Equation 3.5 gives us Bayes rule:
P (H|T ) = P (T |H)P (H)
P (T )
(4.2)
We may then use Theorem 5 for the case of multiple hypotheses Hj to arrive at
Theorem 6: Bayes Theorem
P (H1|T ) = P (T |H1)P (H1)∑
j P (T |Hj)P (Hj)
P (H1) is then known as the prior probability of a particular hypothesis H1; it captures
the state of knowledge about H1 before T is observed. P (H1|T ) is known as the
posterior probability of H1 and measures our augmented state of knowledge about
H1 given that T was observed. P (T |H1) is known as the likelihood function of H1 on
T , and expresses the probability of the observation given that a hypothesis is true.1
P (T ) is called the expectedness (Curd et al., 2013, pg. 531) of the observation. If an
unlikely event occurs (low P (T )) the posterior probability will be high; this is in line
with our intuition — an unlikely event will be very informative about the system.
The abductive inference, then, is to pick the hypothesis, Hj, that has the highest
posterior probability.2 A problem with doing this, already mentioned above, was the
1For a fixed hypothesis Hj , P (T |Hj) is a conditional probability defined on T . If, however, we
fix T and examine the values of P (T |Hj) for different choices of Hj it is not a probability, hence the
term likelihood.
2It is often the case in applications of abduction in inverse theory and statistics that we don’t want
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difficulty in calculating the probability of P (T ) from Equation 5, which may occur
for either practical reasons (too many terms to deal with) or theoretical reasons (the
intractable catch-all hypothesis). For the case of theoretical intractability, the un-
satisfying solution suggested in Section 3.3 was to simply ignore the catch-all and
pretend that the hypotheses being considered are the only ones that exist. Probabil-
ity is then distributed over them and P (T ) can be calculated. This would not lead to
legitimate posterior probabilities, but would effectively allow ranking of the hypothe-
ses. Salmon (2013, page 536), however, uses the alternate procedure of calculating
ratios of posterior probabilities for the different hypotheses being considered as a way
to avoid this problem. For competing hypotheses H1 and H2, he has:
P (H1|T )
P (H2|T ) =
P (T |H1)P (H1)
P (T )
P (T |H2)P (H2)
P (T )
=
P (T |H1)P (H1)
P (T |H2)P (H2) (4.3)
If the ratio is greater than unity, the first hypothesis is deemed more explanatory of
the observations, and vice versa if less than unity.
If the problem of calculating P (T ) comes from the practical consideration of having
too many hypotheses to deal with, I agree with Salmon’s approach. In that case we
know that P (T ) has a numerical value — we just can’t calculate what it is. Thus we
can save ourselves trouble and still find the best choice of hypothesis without worrying
about the term. If, however, we are unable to calculate it for theoretical reasons (i.e.,
the catch-all hypothesis from Section 3.3), Salmon’s approach may not be possible. It
was shown earlier that the term P (¬H)P (T |¬H) was doubly intractable. I put forth
an idea that might allow for practical calculation of P (¬H) if objective assignment
the hypothesis with highest probability. Such a case happens when the hypotheses have some sort of
natural ordering and distance metric defined on them (say, the real numbers). The probabilities then
take the form of a distribution over the real line. The best abduction might then be to take some
sort of moment with respect to the distribution, such as the mean or the median, rather than the
mode (maximum value). Which one to choose depends on the application, and the risk associated
with choosing the wrong hypothesis. For instance, when money is at stake, one might be better
choosing the mean so that on-average losses will be minimized.
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of probability based on elegance principles were possible (Section 3.2.7). It seemed,
however, that even that concept would be of no use in calculating P (T |¬H). The
question then becomes: “Does the value of P (T |¬H) actually exist, even if we could
never access it?”. If not, then P (T )
P (T )
is undefined, and the above equality is nonsense. A
counter-argument, however, might be that with infinite time, for any sub-hypothesis
in the catch-all that we might postulate, a likelihood term could be constructed for
it. In this case Salmon’s idea works. I do not know how to analyze this metaphysical
question any further. Since assuming the existence of a value for P (T |¬H) leads
to useful algorithms, in what follows I’ll assume it does exist, and thus the ratio of
probabilities involving a catch-all hypothesis still has meaning.
4.1.1 Quantitative Parsimony and the Problem of Auxiliary Hypotheses
We examined one form of simplicity in Section 3.2.7, above. There elegance was a
measure of how short a sentence was in a language, and allowed the possibility of an
objective assignment of probability to all sentences in the probabilistic logic. Here we
examine a different kind of simplicity known as parsimony. The principle has existed
since ancient times, and is most commonly known by the name Ockham’s Razor, in
honor of William of Ockham, an English Franciscan friar (Baker, 2013). Ockham
originally argued that nothing should be posited as being true unless it is a self-
evident truth, it is learned through experience, or has been revealed by God. Modern
interpretations of his view have it as saying that of all explanations that fit a set of
observations equally well, we should always pick the one that postulates the fewest
number of entities. The definition of what qualifies as an ‘entity’ has led philosophers
to further break the concept into two sub-categories: quantitative and qualitative
parsimony (Baker, 2013). Quantitative parsimony refers to postulating fewer objects
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in the universe of discourse; qualitative parsimony3 refers to the number of kinds of
objects being postulated.
Quantitative parsimony can be clearly expressed in a probabilistic logic. If a hy-
pothesis H can be split up into the conjunction of numerous independent hypotheses,
H ↔ H1 ∧H2 ∧ · · · ∧HM , we can assign probabilities to obtain
P (H) = P (HM |H1 ∧ · · · ∧HM−1)P (HM−1|H1 ∧ · · · ∧HM−2) · · ·
P (H3|H1 ∧H2)P (H2|H1)P (H1) (4.4)
Since each conditional probability must be less than or equal to unity, the product will
have a strong tendency to become very small as we increase the number of sentences
that make up our hypothesis. Therefore we can see that maximizing parsimony
is equivalent to minimizing the number of independent hypotheses used to explain
observations. We can add more detail to this concept through our hypothesis involving
predictive laws in FOL:
H ←→ (∃c ∀x ∃y Lcxy) ∧ (∃c(c = c′))
We recall that the boldface notation on c meant an array of objects, so (∃c(c = c′))
can be expanded as (∃c1(c1 = c′1))∧ (∃c2(c2 = c′2))∧ · · · ∧ (∃cM(cM = c′M)). Thus this
hypothesis can be rewritten as
H ←→ (4.5)
∀x ∃y Lcxy ∧ (∃c1(c1 = c′1)) ∧ (∃c2(c2 = c′2)) ∧ · · · ∧ (∃cM(cM = c′M))
Since, given the law, each postulated coefficient can be considered a separate hypoth-
esis, as we increase the number of coefficients in the law, it will become less parsi-
3Although the concept of qualitative parsimony is more prominent in the philosophical literature,
I currently don’t know how to incorporate it into the probabilistic logical framework, and therefore
will not address it here.
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monious and the probability of H will decrease. This holds regardless of whether the
individual coefficients (∃c1(c1 = c′1)), (∃c2(c2 = c′2)), etc., are dependent or indepen-
dent of each other. It also holds regardless of how we assign probabilities; adding more
parameters will tend to lower the probability of P (H) because we will be multiplying
more terms together.
Although increasing the number of hypotheses that imply the observations leads
to a lowering of the posterior probability, this assumes that there is no associated
change in the likelihood and expectedness values. If, however, we choose to include
an extra hypothesis that, in conjunction with the current hypotheses, either greatly
increases the likelihood or lowers the expectedness, we may actually increase the
posterior probability. This is known as the Problem of Auxiliary Hypotheses. It is a
common way out of any argument where the observations seem to imply one’s belief
is wrong. By simply including an appropriately chosen new hypothesis, no matter
how outlandish, one can increase their posterior probability. A good example of this
is the case of Bob, above, who needs to invent several hypotheses to reach the same
level of posterior probability as the hypothesis that he is cheating. Perhaps if he had
been more clever, he could have added even more hypotheses that would have made
his alibi perfect and increased his posterior probability above the cheating hypothesis.
A different example would be the Ptolemaic method of epicycles for accounting for
the planetary motions; to achieve higher and higher accuracy, the method has to
postulate more and more epicycles upon epicycles in order to explain observations.
The technique to counter this problem is two-fold: first, the new hypotheses should
be chosen such that they are falsifiable by a new observation that can be performed.
I.e., they should have an high-likelihood implication to a theorem that can be tested.
If the new auxiliary hypothesis is untestable by definition, it should not be admitted.
The second method is an asymptotic one; by collecting more observations the likeli-
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hoods will eventually dominate the priors, thus nullifying the benefit of any kind of
auxiliary hypothesis. A proof of this can be sketched by expanding the denominator
in Bayes rule and comparing it with the numerator. For some hypothesis Hj we have:
P (Hj|T ) = P (T |Hj)P (Hj)
P (T |H1)P (H1) + P (T |H2)P (H2) + · · ·+ P (T |HM)P (HM) (4.6)
where T = T1 ∧ T2 ∧ · · · ∧ TN . Since the likelihood terms P (T |Hj) for any hypothesis
Hj can be expanded as a product of N separate terms (one for each observation),
we can see that its value will decrease with N . As an example, I will assume that
hypothesis H1 tends to be a better explanation for observations, so the rate at which
its likelihood term decreases is slower than for other hypotheses. I will now display
the asymptotic effect of differing rates of convergence for different hypotheses in a
graphical way, by repeating Equation 4.6 for hypothesis H1, but with a smaller font
for the terms that tend towards zero faster.
P (H1|T ) = P (T |H1)P (H1)
P (T |H1)P (H1) + P (T |H2)P (H2) + · · ·+ P (T |HM )P (HM ) (4.7)
We can see that the value of P (H1|T ) will tend towards 1. If we examine another
hypothesis, H2, that tends to explain observations worse, we have the following visual:
P (H2|T ) = P (T |H2)P (H2)
P (T |H1)P (H1) + P (T |H2)P (H2) + · · ·+ P (T |HM )P (HM ) (4.8)
Here we see that the value of P (H2|T ) will tend towards zero. If we instead formed a
ratio of the posteriors for H1 to H2, we would see that it would tend towards infinity
with increasing observations.
4.2 The Error-statistics Approach
A problem with criticizing the Bayesian viewpoint is that there are few alternatives
that lead to a formal calculus for abductive inference. One alternative is to just give
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up and say it proceeds in an ad-hoc evolutionary fashion, where by random chance
better hypotheses tend to survive longer than worse ones. This view was advocated
by Thomas Kuhn (Kuhn, 2012) in his post-script when discussing the progress of
science. I reject Kuhn’s view; it is my opinion that if a philosopher really understands
something about how science progresses he or she should be able to write it out in
a formal logical language — after all, formal languages exist to capture our informal
reasoning in a way that allows it to be checked for accuracy and then applied to
new situations. Although he denies being irrational, Kuhn’s point of view essentially
says there is no rational order to be found that will codify how human reasoning is
performed, and, as a corollary, no way to improve upon it.
One possible alternative for formalizing scientific progress is the “Error-statistics”
approach of Deborah Mayo (Mayo, 2013). This approach is closely associated with the
classical hypothesis testing methods put forward by the statisticians Ronald Fisher,
Jerzy Neyman, and Egon Pearson in the early twentieth century. It is not possible to
give an adequate review of their methods here. The points relevant to our discussion
are the following: Fisher’s approach used an idea similar to the FRPS, above. It
was an absolute test of whether or not the result of an experiment is likely under an
assumed “null hypothesis”4. If it is not, the null hypothesis must be rejected. Neyman
and Pearson used a variant of this principle where hypotheses are only compared to
each other in the form of a ratio. In relation to the ratio test of Bayes theorem, these
methods could be seen as limiting cases where prior probabilities become uniform and
cancel out, thereby leaving only a comparison of likelihood terms.
Mayo argues that since this method removes the possible subjective bias that
comes from the prior probabilities, it is better. She makes the point that in order
to get our priors in the first place, we usually take a frequentist approach and use
empirical data about hypotheses from the past (or at least analogs, if there is no
4The term “null hypothesis” usually refers to a hypothesis that one wishes to disprove.
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empirical data), and by some non-Bayesian method we calculate the prior probabilities
for each hypothesis (Mayo, 2013, page 555). She is correct in stating this, but fails
to realize that the same problem applies to either the Bayesian or Error-statistics
approach when calculating likelihood functions. They are also based on empirical
data, and we would use the same method calculate their values.
As a separate criticism of the Bayesian approach, Mayo also brings up the idea
of a utility function as part of the process of choosing a best theory (Mayo, 2013,
page 552). This would be a function that would take the posterior values over the
hypotheses and weight them according to the subjective values of the community
examining it. These values may be personal prejudices, political views, etc. Mayo
argues that although subjectivity can be modeled by the Bayesian approach in the
form of the priors, it is not possible to compare expected utilities. This is a more
legitimate criticism, but it again fails for the reason that it can be turned against
the Error-statistics approach, also. Instead of weighting posterior probabilities by
the utility function, one could weight the likelihood functions. This would render the
Error-statistics ratio test equally intractable.
Although likelihood ratios are the most common way to compare hypotheses in
the Error-statistics approach, the absolute values would work just as well. In Tables
4.1 through 4.5, below, these values are represented in the fourth column. For some
of the examples the most likely hypothesis (i.e., the one chosen by the Error-statistics
approach) is the same as the one chosen by the Bayesian method. Notable exceptions
are Tables 4.2 and 4.3 for the case of medical diagnosis, where the abduced hypothesis
is different, and Table 4.4, where the Error-statistics approach is indeterminate.
It might seem that the Error-statistics approach is superior because it removes
the bias of prior probabilities, but this depends on whether one sees this as a plus or
a minus. Since prior probabilities were shown above to capture the theoretical virtue
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simplicity (via both elegance and quantitative parsimony), it seems that we are losing
something if we abandon the Bayesian approach in favor of this alternative method.
4.3 Examples
In order to gain further insight into the Bayesian method it is instructive to take
a few clear examples containing several hypothesis along with observations, assign
them reasonable probabilities, and see how the two criteria differ on their decisions
for the optimal hypothesis. This is done in the following section where we return to
the examples from earlier chapters.
In Tables 4.1 through 4.5 we show probabilities related to abduction via Bayes
theorem. The second column of each table is the posterior probability of a hypoth-
esis given the observations. In the third column are the prior probabilities of each
hypothesis. The fourth column gives the joint likelihood of observations (here we are
assuming they are independent of each other and can be calculated as the product
of the individual likelihoods of each observation given the hypothesis). This column
corresponds to the Error-statistics inference criterion for ranking hypotheses. The
fifth column gives the expectedness of all observations co-occurring. The posterior
probability is obtained by multiplying the prior by the likelihood term, and then di-
viding by the expectedness. It should be noted that one cannot calculate the values of
expectedness by assuming that P (T1 ∧ T2 ∧ T3) = P (T1)P (T2)P (T3) and multiplying
together the values of the P (Tj) terms on the right hand side of the top of Tables 3.2
through 3.5. That would be incorrect; the observations are conditionally independent
of each other given a hypothesis, but not unconditionally independent of each other.
This makes intuitive sense, since the probability of the T ’s may have strange depen-
dencies among themselves, e.g., with the medical diagnosis example below, slow onset
of symptoms tends to happen when symptoms appear at old age, while rapid onset
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tends to happen when they appear at a younger age. The correct way to calculate
P (T1 ∧ T2 ∧ T3) is therefore to use Theorem 5.
Figures 4·1 through 4·5 show the same examples from Figure 3·1 through 3·4,
except we have now put a red asterisk by the theorems that were actually observed,
and we have ‘pruned the deductive tree’ to remove any implications that don’t lead
to these observations. We have also listed the posterior probability in red letters next
to each of the hypotheses.
Beginning with Table 4.1, we see the probabilities associated with abducing either
Ptolemaic or Copernican astronomy as being the best hypothesis based on astronom-
ical data. Here we have assumed a priori that both theories were on equal footing,
and thus assigned a probability of 0.5 to each. As an example of calculating the
expectedness term from Theorem 5, we plug in prior and likelihood values to the
following equation
P (¬T1 ∧ T2 ∧ T3) = P (H1)P (¬T1|H1)P (T2|H1)P (T3|H1) + (4.9)
P (H2)P (¬T1|H2)P (T2|H2)P (T3|H2)
and show the result in the last column of Table 4.1. Then, using Bayes theorem
we obtain the posterior values in the second column. From these we can see from a
Bayesian viewpoint that Copernican astronomy is greatly favored over Ptolemaic —
so much so that Ptolemaic astronomy has almost a negligible chance of being true.
In this particular example of Ptolemy versus Copernicus, since both the prior and
expectedness terms remain constant for both hypotheses, we can see that the ratio
of posterior probabilities will only differ from the ratio of likelihoods by a constant
factor. Therefore the Error-statistics criterion gives us the same answer as Bayesian
inference (although Bayes can give actual probabilities, while Error-statistics can only
give likelihoods).
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Although this analysis of competing scientific theories is interesting and may ac-
curately describe the process of choosing a superior theory in principle, a question
to ask is whether it can be used in practice. I know of no case where it actually has
been done, but I see no reason that it could not be attempted. The fact that there is
no universally agreed upon method to assign probabilities does not, and should not,
preclude it from being used. If two scientific communities can agree upon the same
values for the assignment of probabilities, it would be trivial to decide on the supe-
rior theory; but even if they don’t agree (and thereby arrive at different inferences)
they can at least retrace their steps and examine why their posterior probabilities
on the hypotheses are different. This would perhaps point out over-confident prior
probabilities that are not founded in any previous experience or logical argument.
And, furthermore, even if both sides of an argument happen to agree on the prior
probability values of their respective hypotheses that are input into a probabilistic
inference method, the losing side would not have to give up its normal science. If,
over time, it could be seen that adding observations was shifting the ratio of proba-
bilities in their favor, it would be logical to continue investigation until the maximum
posterior probability switched to their hypothesis. This is reminiscent of the Kuh-
nian idea that scientists working on a new hypothesis should be allowed to continue
work, even if early results show that their system does not fit the observations as well
as the entrenched paradigm does. Indeed, Kuhn in his later years agreed, at least
in concept, with the Bayesian viewpoint as a method for deciding between scientific
theories (Kuhn, 2013, page 101):
. . . each scientist chooses between competing theories by deploying
some Bayesian algorithm which permits him to compute a value for P (H|T ),
i.e., for the probability of a hypothesis H on the observation T available
both to him and to other members of his professional group at a particular
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period of time. [My terms and notation.]
We now turn to the second example of medical diagnosis for Parkinson-like symp-
toms, where we will examine two separate cases: first, the observed symptoms are in
an older patient who had a sudden onset; second, we have a young patient with slow
onset of symptoms. Looking at Table 4.2 for the first case we see that the posterior
probability on the hypotheses is greatest for H2 (that there are Lewy bodies in the
neurons of the Substantia Nigra — the classic cause of Parkinson’s disease). The
posterior probabilities for the second case are shown in Table 4.3, and also makes the
same abductive choice of hypothesis given the observations. Since prior probabilities
are different, the Error-statistics viewpoint gives quite different answers for this ex-
ample. For the first case it assigns the highest likelihood to H3, the hypothesis that
chemicals in hard drugs caused the symptoms. For the second case it assigns the
highest likelihood to H1, the hypothesis that the Parkinson gene is the cause. This
example therefore shows where Bayesian and Error-statistics viewpoints can give very
different answers. The difference comes from the prior probabilities which bias the
abductive choice of optimal hypothesis.
Next we turn to the example of Bob, who may or may not be cheating on his wife.
Here the observations are that Bob was seen with another woman at a bar (T1), he
came home from work with lipstick on his collar (T2), and he had a large un-expected
bill from a jeweler (T3). There are two possible explanations (hypotheses) for these
facts; the first is much simpler than the second. Since it seems reasonable to assign
higher probability to simpler hypotheses, we give the straightforward explanation that
Bob is cheating a probability of 0.75 that it is true. Bob’s complex explanation, since
it must postulate many auxiliary hypotheses, is given a lower probability of 0.25.
The likelihood of the observations under either hypothesis is equal, so Error-statistics
inference is indeterminate as to which hypothesis is better. In this case the prior
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probabilities directly translate to the posterior probabilities and H1 is chosen as the
best hypothesis. Thus Bob’s guilt rests solely on the fact that his explanation for the
observations was more convoluted than the simple explanation that he is cheating.
Finally we come to our last example of abduction — that of finding an optimal
polynomial curve that fits empirical data. We have limited ourselves to only two
possible polynomials (first or second order), and for each of them, two possible choices
of coefficients per polynomial. This gives a total of four possible hypotheses to be
evaluated given three observed data points. Higher prior probabilities are given to
the the lower order polynomial due to its shorter syntactic description (elegance)
and the fact that it only postulates the existence of two coefficients instead of three
(parsimony). The likelihood is highest for H4, the higher order polynomial with
coefficients that allow it to fit all three data points at the same time. The other second
order polynomial only fits one data point (hence the lowest likelihood), and the two
first order polynomials fit two data points, each (hence the same lower likelihood for
each of them). Error-statistics inference would then choose H4 as the best hypothesis.
Combining likelihoods with expectedness and prior probabilities in Bayes rule leads
to the same conclusion in this example. Thus for these particular observations and
likelihoods a more complicated hypothesis that more accurately fits more observations
is a better choice than a simpler one.
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P (H|¬T1 ∧ T2 ∧ T3) P (H) P (¬T1 ∧ T2 ∧ T3|H) P (¬T1 ∧ T2 ∧ T3)
H1 0.02539 0.5 0.009801 0.1930005
H2 0.97461 0.5 0.3762 0.1930005
Table 4.1: Posterior and prior probabilities, along with likelihood
and expectedness values for the case of Ptolemaic versus Copernican
astronomy. Graphically represented in Figure 4·1.
Figure 4·1: Posterior probabilities on the hypotheses for Ptolemaic
versus Copernican astronomy (from Table 4.1). Red stars indicate the
theorems that were observed. The deductive tree from Figure 3·1 is
‘pruned’ to remove all implications that do not lead to observations.
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P (H|¬T1 ∧ T2) P (H) P (¬T1 ∧ T2|H) P (¬T1 ∧ T2)
H1 0.06916 0.05 0.02 0.01446
H2 0.58506 0.94 0.009 0.01446
H3 0.34578 0.01 0.5 0.01446
Table 4.2: Posterior and prior probabilities, along with likelihood and
expectedness values for the case of diagnosing Parkinson-like symptoms.
Graphically represented in Figure 4·2.
Figure 4·2: Posterior probabilities on the hypotheses for the diagnosis
of Parkinson-like symptoms (from Table 4.2). Red stars indicate the
theorems that were observed. The deductive tree from Figure 3·2 is
‘pruned’ to remove all implications that do not lead to observations.
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P (H|T1 ∧ ¬T2) P (H) P (T1 ∧ ¬T2|H) P (T1 ∧ ¬T2)
H1 0.27894 0.05 0.72 0.12906
H2 0.72106 0.94 0.099 0.12906
H3 0 0.01 0 0.12906
Table 4.3: Posterior and prior probabilities, along with likelihood and
expectedness values for an alternate case of diagnosing Parkinson-like
symptoms. Graphically represented in Figure 4·3.
Figure 4·3: Posterior probabilities on the hypotheses for the diagnosis
of Parkinson-like symptoms (from Table 4.3). Red stars indicate the
theorems that were observed. The deductive tree from Figure 3·2 is
‘pruned’ to remove all implications that do not lead to observations.
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P (H|T1 ∧ T2 ∧ T3) P (H) P (T1 ∧ T2 ∧ T3|H) P (T1 ∧ T2 ∧ T3)
H1 0.75 0.75 0.0002 0.0002
H2 0.25 0.25 0.0002 0.0002
Table 4.4: Posterior and prior probabilities, along with likelihood and
expectedness values for the case of determining whether or not Bob is
cheating on his wife. Graphically represented in Figure 4·4.
Figure 4·4: Posterior probabilities on the hypotheses that Bob is or
isn’t cheating on his wife (from Table 4.4). Red stars indicate the
theorems that were observed. The deductive tree from Figure 3·3 is
‘pruned’ to remove all implications that do not lead to observations.
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P (H|T1 ∧ T2 ∧ T3) P (H) P (T1 ∧ T2 ∧ T3|H) P (T1 ∧ T2 ∧ T3)
H1 0.115163 0.375 0.0004 0.0013025
H2 0.115163 0.375 0.0004 0.0013025
H3 0.001919 0.125 0.00002 0.0013025
H4 0.767754 0.125 0.008 0.0013025
Table 4.5: Posterior and prior probabilities, along with likelihood and
expectedness values for the case of finding a polynomial curve to fit
empirical data. Graphically represented in Figure 4·5.
Figure 4·5: Posterior probabilities on the hypotheses of which order
polynomial and which coefficients best predict observed empirical data
(from Table 4.5). Red stars indicate the theorems that were observed.
The deductive tree from Figure 3·4 is ‘pruned’ to remove all implications
that do not lead to observations.
Chapter 5
Conclusions
My first goal in this work was to combine deduction, induction, and abduction into
a single coherent framework for inference. I began with deductive inference, which
gave us the structure of a formal logical language (FOL in our case), along with it’s
syntax and rule of inference, Modus Ponens. Inductive inference added the concept
of probability and thus created a probabilistic logic. Abduction to a best hypothesis
was then implicit in this new framework via Bayes rule.
In examining deductive inference, I argued that mathematics and science have the
same basic structure, since they both can be represented with FOL, and just differ
in their semantics. Making the connection between the two required mapping the
concept of ‘observation’ from science to mathematics. Whereas in science, observa-
tions are phenomena that we perceive with our senses, I argued that in mathematics
the equivalent concept is a numerical relationship that is observed to hold for all em-
pirically tested values. In this view such an observation would eventually be derived
from the existing premises, or else be included as a new premise (if independent of the
existing ones), or else retain it’s status as a “conjecture”. I realize that this is a very
speculative claim, and I have not laid out a convincing air-tight argument for it. Yet
it seems that the formal language of FOL provides a means to prove the deductive
results of both science and mathematics, which implies some kind of common struc-
ture. Several of the most famous logicians and mathematicians of the past century
have viewed the increase of mathematical knowledge as a quasi-empirical process, and
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thus — I argue — my claim is worthy of further investigation.
When examining inductive inference, I argued that the problem of induction
should be recast not just as the problem of creating and justifying hypotheses and
implications, but also as the problem of justifying the probabilities assigned to them.
I presented various historical theories that provide a rationale for doing this, and
made a case for a modified version of Popper’s Propensity theory as the most general
and viable method. My small modification drew the idea of assigning probabilities
to sentences (rather than to ‘events’ or ‘sets’) from Keynes’ Logical theory.
Upon assigning probability to sentences, mathematics could be seen as the de-
terministic limiting case of a probabilistic deductive system. This, however, led to a
potential problem if probabilities were assigned to the axioms of ZFC. My conclusion
was that, since probabilities other than 0 or 1 lead to a paradox, then they are the
only values that can be rationally assigned to these particular axioms. This is another
speculative idea, and will require much further investigation to determine if the con-
cept of probability is allowable in the context of a (usually) completely deterministic
method of inference.
The second goal in this work was to show that the Bayesian method could handle
any problem of abduction that contained a finite number of premises and theorems. I
attempted to do this by addressing two traditional criticisms of Bayesian confirmation:
the Problem of the Catch-all Hypothesis and the Problem of Auxiliary Hypotheses.
I used four examples to illustrate my points throughout this work. They came
from the philosophy of science, medicine, law, and statistics. I chose them to be
as different from each other as possible in order to show scope of my probabilistic
viewpoint. In these examples I assigned probabilities to hypotheses and implications
arbitrarily. I argued that the particular values were irrelevant; I only wished to
show how probabilities of theorems and posterior probabilities of hypotheses could be
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calculated once the values were assigned. Indeed, for cases such as Copernican versus
Ptolemaic astronomy, it may be impossible to assign such probabilities. Although
not practical in that case, I argued that the Bayesian method can still be applied in
principle, and is the correct way analyze the decision-making process of choosing one
hypothesis over another.
The exposition of all the topics I presented in this work was brief and cursory; a
full examination any one of them would take considerably much more time and effort.
Rather than on focusing on just one area, I was more interested in connecting the dots
and seeing how a coherent whole that captures all aspects of inference might emerge
from probabilistic logic. It is my hope that this work might be a useful clarification
of all the concepts discussed.
5.1 Future Directions
There were several topics related to probabilistic logic that were either mentioned
briefly in this work, or else not at all, but are very interesting and worthy of further
exploration:
1. The one problem of induction that I did not address was how to create hypothe-
ses, or subjectively assign specific values of probability to them. I stated that
I consider this outside of the realm of any formal symbolic representation, and
relies on some kind of inspiration or access to an objectively real Platonic world
of ideas. It therefore lies in the realm of psychology, neuroscience, or theology,
and was thus outside of the scope here. Any further study of this would then
require looking into one, or all, of those areas.
2. Related to the first topic, the idea of syntactic elegance as an objective method
for assigning probabilities is an extremely important topic. If feasible, it would
completely transform practical inference methods. There would no longer be
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any subjectivity in the process of assigning probabilities other than using human
intuition to try and find the minimum length representation of any given formula
(and thus its probability), since this is known to be an uncomputable task.
3. The paradox from Section 3.2.8 was intriguing, and it would be interesting to
see if other deductive systems similarly limit the values of probability that can
be assigned to their axioms. A place to start would be to examine the logical
axioms themselves, such as, e.g., the Law of Excluded Middle.
4. Robustness has recently become a hot topic in philosophy (Levins, 1966; Orzack
and Sober, 1993; Weisberg, 2006; Calcott, 2011; Kuorikoski et al., 2010). The
word can refer to a number of different concepts, but what they have in common
is the idea of stability under some kind of perturbation. In a non-probabilistic
deductive setting a robust theorem is one that is implied by multiple differ-
ent hypotheses and is stable under perturbation of those hypotheses — where
‘perturbation’ in this case refers to the removal of one or more of them. In
a probabilistic logic robustness would then involve not just the number of hy-
potheses and implications, but also the probabilities assigned to them. It would
be interesting to see whether robustness offers an alternative to the Bayesian
method for determining the most probable theorems and abduced hypotheses.
5. I did not examine how inference within probabilistic logic changes when there
are countably, or uncountably infinite numbers of sentences involved. It was
beyond the scope here, and a full analysis of the would require an in-depth
study of the justifiability and feasibility of the concept.
6. Whereas the aspects of simplicity known as elegance and quantitative parsimony
could be shown to fit in my probabilistic logic framework, I did not examine
how qualitative parsimony (i.e., the number of different kinds of entities being
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postulated) enters into it. It is currently not clear how more types of entities
would lower the probability of a hypothesis.
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